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When the u.s. Congress voted to phase-out the federal estate tax by 20 I0
and President Bush signed the legislation in Juoe 200 I,' the United States
joined a small but growing number of developed countries in which taxes on
the transfer ofwealth have been abolished," In Canada, federal gift and estate
taxes were repealed in 1972 and provincial wealth transfer taxes were
abolished in the 1970s and 1980s. In Australia, state and connnonwealtb
wealth transfer taxes were repealed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. New
Zealand followed suit in the 1990s, reducing estate tax rates to zero in 1992
and repealing the tax in 1999. While the United Kingdom continues to collect
taxes on the transfer of wealth, the role of these taxes has declined
substantially over the last 30 years,' and calls for repeal are often heard.' As
a result, U.S. repeal should not be viewed as an isolated event, but as part of
a broader international trend.
1. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act af2001,Pub. L No. 107-16, § 501, 115
Stat. 38, 69 (2001). Thephase-out is accomplished by increasing the exclusion amount and reducing rates
between 2002 and 2009, culminating in repeal for the year 2010. Under a sunset provision, however, the
legislation providing for this phase-out andrepeal is itselfrepealed after December 31, 201Q-----.resultingin
the restoration ofthe tax in 2011. For a detailed description ofthis legislation, see rye J. Klooster, Repeal
ofthe Death Tax? Shoving Aside the Rhetoric to Determine the Consequences ofthe Economic Growth
and Tax ReliefReconciliation Act of 2001, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 633, 633-65 (2003). According to one
commentator, "[tJhe fact that there will be two presidential and four congressional elections before the
estate tax is fully repealed means that it is possible that the repeal will never happen at all orthat the sunset
provision will stand and the estate tax will return in 2011." Mary R. Wampler, Repealing the Federal
Estate Tax: Death to the Death Tax, or Will Reform Save the Day?, 25 SETON HALLLEGIS.J. 525, 534
(2001). For a useful explanation oftbe budget process that led to the sunset provision and the budgetary
implications ofpermanent repeal, see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal and
the Budget Process, 104 TAXNOTES 1049, 1049-57 (2004).
2. For an excellent account of the events leading up to repeal in the United States, see MICHAEL
J. GRAETZ & IANSHAPlRO, DEATHBYA'THOUSAND CUTS: THEFIGHTOVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH
4 (2005). For a recent argument that Congress might benefit from uncertainty regarding repeal of the
federal gift and estate taxes, see Edward 1. McCaffery & linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: A
Tale ofDeath, Money and Taxes (Univ. S. Cal. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-20, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/ahsUact==-581084.
3. See ORO. FORECON.COOPERATION & DEV., REVENUE STATISTICS OFO.E.C.D. COUNTRIES
(2003) [hereinafter O.E.C.D.]. In 1972, estate and gift taxes accounted for 23% of total revenues in the
United Kingdom and 0.7% of gross domestic product; in 2002, these figures were 0.6% and 0.2%,
respectively.
4. See, e.g., BARRY BRACEWELL-MiLNES, EUTHANASIA FOR DEATH DUTIES: PuTTING
INHERITANCE TAXOUTOFITSMiSERY(2002).
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Whatever the advantages or disadvantages ofthese taxes,' commentators
are often puzzled by the apparent political vulnerability of wealth transfer
taxes since they generally apply only to a small percentage of substantial
estates." For some, political opposition to these taxes stems from
psychological factors, such as the association between the tax and death/ or
an irrational optimism on the part of many people that they will actually be
subject to the tax} For others, it is largely ideological, reflecting a
conservative emphasis on individual enterprise and an increased hostility to
redistributive taxation." Although conservative electoral victories have
certainly contnbuted to the decline of wealth transfer taxes," more
progressive political parties have also been willing to abandon these taxes and
have been reluctant to restore them once repealed. I I
5. The merits of these taxes are widely disputed. Advocates tend to emphasize their contribution
to tID: progressivity, their social role to lessen inequalities and unequal opportunities., and their assumed
economic superiority to income taxes. See, e.g., JOSEPHA. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAXPOLlCY 234 (5th 00.
1987) (commenting that wealth transfer taxes have "less adverse effects on incentives than do incometaxes
of'equal yield"); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALEL.J.259 (1983); Eric
Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAXL. REv. 419 (1996). Critics, on theotherhand, condemn
their relatively low revenue yield, high collection costs, avoidability, and alleged impact on savings and
entrepreneurship. See, e.g., RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEATH AND TAXES: SOME PERSPEcrlvES ON
INHERITANCE, INEQUALlTY, ANDPROGRESSIVE TAXATION 23-30 (1973); Joel C. Debris, A Brieffor the
Abolition ofAll Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1215 (1984); EdwardJ. McCaffery, The Political
Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHILOS. & PuB. AFF. 281 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery, The
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE LJ. 283 (1994). For my own views on wealth
transfer taxation, see David G. Duff; Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN.LL. &
JURIS.3 (1993).
6. In the United States, for example, only 4.3% ofdecedears were required to file estate rax rerums
in 1998, and only half of these were required to pay any tax. See WILLIAM G. GALE & JOELSLEMROD,
Overview to RETHlNKJNG ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 7-9 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001). In the
United Kingdom, it is estimated that only 3.5-4% ofestates pay inheritance tax. See DOMENIC Mxxwrt.r,
FAIRDUES: TOWARDS A MORE PROGRESSIVE INHERITANCE TAX 11 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Richard Bird, The Taxation ofPersonal Wealth in International Perspective, 17 CAN.
PuB.POL'y 322, 330 (1991) (pointing to"theconjunctionoftwo events [death and taxes] that few people
contemplate with pleasure ....").
8. see, e.g-, Graetz, supra note 5, at 285.
9. See, e.g., Keith G.Banting, ThePoliticsofWealth Taxes, l1CAN.PuB.POL'y 351,364 (1991);
see also EDWARD J;MCCAFFERY,FAIRNoT Fl.AT: How TOMAKETHETAXSYSTEM BETTER ANDSIMPLER
66 (2003) (suggesting that wealth transfer taxes contradict "common-sense morality"). For a detailed study
ofthe relationship between ideologicalperspectives and wealth transfer taxes in Canada, see LisaPhilipps,
TaxingInherited Wealth: Ideologies AboutProperty and the Familyin Canada (March 1992) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School) (on file with author).
10. In the United States, fur example, Republican control of the Congress and the White House
precipitated repeal of the federal estate tax in 2001. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 4. Likewise,
in Australia, electoral victoryby the liberal Party under Malcolm Fraser preceded the repeal ofthe federal
estate tax effective July 1, 1979. See infra text accompanying note 280.
11. In Canada, fur example, it was the Liberal Party under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau which
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In addition to these explanations for the decline and repeal of wealth
transfer taxes, public choice theory provides an alternative account,
emphasizing the political costs and benefits of different tax policies and the
tendency for electoral competition to promote "political efficiency" in the
revenue structures adopted by governments over time." To the extent that
wealthtransfer taxesentail greaterpolitical costs and fewerperceived benefits
than other tax measures yielding comparable revenue yields, it is not
surprising that they might be politically vulnerable.
This article examines the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, relying on public choice theories of politically
efficient revenue structures to help explain the repeal of these taxes in each
country. Part II outlines the essential elements of this theoretical approach
and its implications for tax policy. Part ill surveys the history of wealth
transfer taxes in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, examining in detail the
events leading up to the repeal of these taxes and illustrating the relevance of
public choice theory to their abolition in each country. Part IV offers brief
conclusions on the significance of this experience for the future of wealth
transfer taxation.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND TAX POLICY
In the fields ofpublic finance and tax policy, much writing is essentially
nonnative, establishing criteria for an ideal tax structure and evaluating actual
tax regimes against this ideal." In contrast, public choice theories of
politically efficient revenue structures are largely positive, attempting to
explain the kinds of tax structures and tax reforms that actually exist in
repealed the federal gift and estate taxes in 1971, notwithstanding that Trudeau had campaigned and won
the 1968 election by promising a "Just Society." Similarly, in Australia, Labor Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam promised to abolish federal death duties in 1975 in an unsuccessful bid to stay in office. In the
United States as well, as Graetz and Shapiro document, Democrats have been reluctant to defend the estate
tax. See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 5.
12. See, e.g., W.!R.WINGILLESPIE, TAX, BORROW AND SPEND: FINANCING FEDERAL SPENDING IN
CANADA, 1867-1990 (1991); WALTER HETTICH & STANLEY 1. WINER, DEMOCRATIC CHOiCE AND
TAXATION: A THEORETlCALAND EMPIRICAL ANAL YSIS (1999).
13. Tbisis rrueof'traditicual public fmanceas well asmorerecenttheories of optimal taxation. See,
e-g.,RiCHARD A.MUSGRAVEET AL.,PuBLICFiNANCE IN'fHEORY ANDPRACTlCE (l987);JamesA Mirrlees,
An Exploration in the Theory a/Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REv. EeON.STUD. 175 (1971). It is also
true ofrnuch legal tax. scholarship, particularly scholarship based on the Haig-Simons concept of income
and the concept of tax. expenditures pioneered by Stanley Surrey. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITiON OFINCOME AS APROBLEM OFFISCAL POLICY (1938); SrANLEY s.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THECONCEPT OFTAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
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modern democratic societies." The following sections provide a brief
introduction to this theoretical approach, explaining the main determinants of
political efficiency within this framework and the manner in which political
efficiency is apt to be pursued through tax policy.
A. Public Choice and Political Efficiency
Public choice theory has been defined as "the economic study of
nonmarket decision making" or "the application of economics to political
science.':" As such, it concerns itself with traditional topics of political
science such as voting behavior, party politics, and interest group activities,
but examines these phenomena through the lens of economic methodology
premised on rational choice subject to constraints." As economic analysis
predicts that a perfectly competitive market tends toward an equilibrium at
which economic resources are efficiently allocated, so public choice theory
predicts that competition among political parties tends toward a political
equilibrium where public policies assume a politically efficient form." In
order to understand this concept ofpolitical efficiency and the form that it is
likely to take, it is useful to examine the motivations and constraints that
public choice theory assigns to the central actors in the political process:
voters, politicians and political parties, and organized interest groups."
1. Voters
The startingpoint for a public choice theory ofpolitical efficiency is a set
ofassumptions regarding voters and the reasons why they vote. Sharing with
economic theory the premise that individuals are rational utility maximizers,19
14. GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 14-17. Not surprisingly, ofcourse, these positive theories may have
normative implications regarding, for example, constitutional arrangements regarding themanner in which
revenue decisions are made. See, e.g., JAMESM. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LoGICALFOUNDAnONS Of CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 297-306 (1962);see also GILLESPIE,
supra note 12, at 17 (suggesting that "a positive model of revenue structure could assist those ofus who
advise governments on the tax changes that ought to be made.").
15. DENNIS C. MUELLER,PuBLIC CHOICEII, at 1 (1989).
16. ld. at 1-2.
17. GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 16; HETTICH & WINER, supra note 12, at 2.
18. Although it is not essential for the purpose of this article, many public choice theories also
consider the behavior ofthe bureaucracy and the mass media. See, e.g., DoUGLASG. HARTLE,CANADIAN
TAX PAPERNo. 81, THE EXPENDITURE BUDGETPROCESSOf THEGoVERNMENT OF CANADA: A PuBLIC
CHOICE-RENT-SEEK1NG PERSPECflVE35-68 (1988).
19. See, e.g., MUELLER,supra note IS, at 2.
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public choice theory postulates that voters will generally cast their ballots for
candidates and political parties whose policies are expected to maximize their
net utility." In the context ofgovernment expenditure and revenue policies,
public choice theory generally assumes that voters will favor candidates and
politicalparties whose policies are expected to maximize the benefits that they
reeei ve from government expenditures while minimizing the taxes that they
are required to pay." Voters may also favor certain kinds oftaxes over others,
notwithstanding that amounts owing are the same, suggesting that differential
preferences for different kinds of taxes may also play a role in voting
decisions."
In addition to the hypothesis that voters will select candidates and
political parties whose policies are expected to maximize the voters' own net
utility, public choice theory also predicts that voting decisions are generally
based on limited knowledge of actual policies and their likely consequences.
Since the time and effort to obtain this information is considerable, and the
probability of one's vote affecting the outcome of an election is negligible,
public choice theory predicts that most voters will remain "rationally
ignorant" ofmost policies---ignoring specific details and basing their choices
on perceived impacts on net utility as well as more general perceptions of
trustworthiness and feelings of emotional attachment." In the field of tax
policy, this phenomenon is likely to be particularly pronounced given the
complexity ofthe issues involved." Since the expected benefits of acquiring
20. For an early expression ofthis rational voter hypothesis, see ANTHONY DOWNS,.ANECONOMIC
THEORYOF DEMOCRACY (1957); see also WILLIAM RIKER & PEDER ORDESHOOK, INTRODUCTION TO
POSITIVE POLiTICAL THEORY (1973); GoRDONTuLLOCK,TOWARDS AMATHEMATICSOFPOLrflCS 110-14
(1967). While the concept of "utility" for this purpose might be broadly defined to include an inter-
subjective interest in the welfare of others or a Kantian concern with just social institutions, public choice
theory tends to ignore this possibility by assuming an egoistic conception of human beings and a narrow
and self-interested notion ofutility.
21. See GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 17 (explaining that political parties in the pursuit of electoral
victory attempt to "maximize the political benefits from spending and minimize the political costs of
financing the spending ....").
22. Id. at 26~27. To theextenrthatdifferenrial preferences for different kinds oftaxes reflect notions
oftax fairness, therecognition of these tax preferences as a factor in voting decisions suggests that voters
may be motivated by something other than self- interest narrowly understood. For an attempt to rationalize
ideas oftax fairness in terms ofutilitymaximization, see DOUGLAS G. HARTLE, DISCUSSION PAf'ERNo. 290,
POLITICAL ECONOMY OFTAX REFORM: SIX CASESTUDIES 52-54 (1985).
23. See DOWNS,SUpra note 20, at 207-37.
24. See Banting,supru note 9, at 353 (emphasizing that "[mjost voters are not well-informed about
the complex world oftaxation. There is limited understanding not only of technical language and abstract
concepts such as equity, but also of elementary issues such as whether one 'WOuld benefit from a specific
proposal."), Douglas G. Hartle, Some Analytical, Political and Normative Lessons from Carter, in THE
QUESTFORTAXREFORM 415 CW. NeilBrooks ed., 1988) (suggesting rbar mostvorers' perceptions oftheir
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information are greater where policies touch on voters' most immediate
interests, however, voters are likely to devote more resources to inform
themselves about these measures." As a result, affluent individuals and
corporations can be expected to be much better informed and well-advised
than most about the taxes they pay and about the tax policies proposed by
politicians and political parties."
Not surprisingly, critics have challenged as limited and unrealistic both
the self-interested view of voting that public choice theory assumes and the
egoistic conception ofhuman beings on which it is based." Indeed, since it
is irrational-to expect that a single vote will affect the outcome ofan election,
the very act of voting itself suggests that voters must be motivated by
considerations other than self-interested utility maximization narrowly
defined." While one might attempt to rescue the theory of self-interested
voting by assuming a psychological benefit from the act of voting," or
distinguishing the (unselfish) decision to vote from the (selfish) choice of
candidate or political party, it seemsmore realistic to admit that altruistic and
ethical motivations are likely to mix with more selfish considerations when
voters cast their ballots." At the same time, the theory that most voters
remain rationally ignorant of actual policies calls into question the
significance of their votes for public policy more generally."
own interests "are, more likely than notseriously flawed when it comes to the details ofthe tax structure
as a whole").
25. HARTLE, supra note 22, a125.
26. See Banting, supra note 9, at 353 (observing that "those with a large stake in tax battles inform
themselves and equip themselves with a phalanx ofprofessional advisors").
27. See Herbert Hovenkamp,Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI.L. REv. 63,
85-89 (1990); Joseph P. Kalt &Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory ofPolitics,
74 AM. ECON.REv. 279 (1984). For more general criticisms of public choice theory, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHlLJP P. FRlCKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRlTlCAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Mark
Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 'Empirical' Practice of the
Public Choice Movement, 74 VA.L REv. 199 (1988).
28. Fora discussion of this "paradox" ofvoting, see MUELLER, supra note 15, at 348-72
29. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro,BeyondPublic Choice and Public Interest: A Study ofthe Legislative
Process as Illustrated by TaxLegislation in the 1990s, l39U. PENN.L. REv. 1,77 (1990)(suggestingthat
the act of voting can be understood as a source of utility in itself, "involving symbolic or expressive
behavior").
30. See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY (1982); Amitai
Etzioni, The Case jar a Multiple Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159 (1986); Robert E. Goodin &
Kevin W.S. Roberts, The Ethical Voter, 69 AM.POL. SCI.REv. 926 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating Political
Alternatives, 28 A.\<l. BEHAV. SCI. 185 (1984) (arguing that voting decisions are primarily expressive or
symbolic rather than instrumental).
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While these criticisms undoubtedly lessen the predictive power ofpublic
choice theory to some extent, they do not render it worthless. On the contrary,
although it is probably mistaken to assume that altruistic and ethical
motivations play no role in voting decisions, it is also likely that selfish
considerations have a significant effect on the choices that are ultimately
made. Similarly, while imperfect information weakens the link between
voting decisionsandpublic policy outcomes,it seemsunlikely that voters will
systematically ignore their own interests on a consistent basis, and it is
important to recognize that voters are likely to be more knowledgeable about
policies affecting their most immediate :interests. For these reasons, the basic
premise ofpublic choice theory that voters will tend to favor candidates and
political parties whose policies are perceived to maximize their net utility is
likely to have considerable predictive value, notwithstanding the phenomenon
of rational ignorance and the narrow conception of human motivation on
which public choice theory is based.
2. Politicians and Political Parties
For public choice theory, politicians and political parties, like voters, are
also assumed to be rational utility maximizers." Unlike voters, however, who
pursue this goal by casting ballots for candidates and political parties whose
policies are perceived to maximize their net utility, politicians and political
parties are presumed to maximize their utility by winning elections." Since
voters are assumedto favor candidates and political parties whose policies are
expected to maximize their net utility, it follows that elections are most likely
to be won by politicians and political parties whose platforms are perceived
to maximize the net utility of the largest number of voters." However,
because voter preferences are not immediately transparent to politicians and
political parties, and voters themselves are generally unfamiliar with specific
policies, public choice theoryalso predicts that politicians and political parties
can increase the likelihood of electoral success by employing strategies and
obtaining resources that enable them to better discern voter preferences (e.g.,
by consulting with interest groups, polling, and pre-testing policies with focus
32. MUELLER, supra note 15, at 179.
33. See, e.g-,DOWNS, supra note 20, at 28.
34. See, e.g-, MUELLER, supra note 15, at 214 (suggesting that "competition for votes between
candidates leads them 'as ifby an invisible hand' to platforms that maximize social welfare").
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groups) and to promote their policies and images (e.g., through media
exposure and advertising)."
As with public choice theory of voting behavior, critics have also
questioned the assumption that politicians and political parties are driven
solely by the goal ofelectoral success." Ideological objectives, for example,
are undoubtedly also present, as politicians andpolitical parties certainly seek
to influence voters' perceptions of their own best interests in order to win
elections and to shape public policy outcomes according to their ideological
preferences once in government or in opposition." More sophisticatedpublic
choice theories of politicians and political parties should also account for
different institutions and electoral rules which may create different strategies
for electoral success." In countries with proportional representation, for
example, parties and politicians may pursue a narrow voting base instead of
a majority block.
Notwithstanding other motivations, however, the logic of electoral
competition suggests that politicians and political parties will over time not
only seek electoral success, but will also devise campaign strategies and
political platforms designed to appeal to the largest number of voters."
Through a process of"natural selection," therefore, one can expect that public
policies in a democratic society will tend toward political efficiency. 40
3. Organized Interest Groups
Interest groups constitute a third group of political actors who are central
to public choice theories ofpolitical efficiency. Unlike voters and politicians,
who are assumed to maximize their own individual utilities, interest groups
are assumed to promote the common interests of their members." This is
accomplishedby informing members about publicpolicyissues affecting their
interests.v lobbying politicians and political parties in order to obtain policies
35. For a discussion of''probabilistic voting," see id. at 196-216.
36. See, e.g., Shaviro,supra note 29, at 81-87.
37. Foran analysis of ideology, see MUELLER, supra note 15, at 286-301.
38. Seeid.at217-28.
39. See, e.g., HARTLE, supra note 18, at xviii-xix {noting that when policies are politically
inefficient, "there is an opportunity afforded the opposition parties to form a new coalition that will gain
power at the expense ofthe ruling coalition'').
40. See, e.g., Shaviro,supra note 29, at 88 (referring to a process of"natural selection" that can play
a role notwithstanding the motivations of some politicians or political parties).
41. See, e.g., MANCUROLSON,THE LOGICOFCOLLECTIVE ACTION 5-8 (8th prtg. 1980).
42. See, e.g., HARTLE, supra note 18, at 62-63 (referring to this as the "intelligence function" of
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favorable to members," and promoting policies that advance the common
interests of members through direct advertising and the mass media." As a
general rule, these services take the form of public or collective goods, the
benefits from which cannot easily be limited to those who are willing to incur
their costs through membership."
Of particular importance to public choice theory is the existence of
information and transactions costs and collective action (free-rider) problems
that affect the likelihoodthat persons with common interests will establish and
maintain an organized entity to promote their interests. Because persons are
expected to be better informed about matters affecting their most immediate
interests than about more general or public interests, public choice theory
predicts that narrow or special interests will be better represented by
organized interest groups than more general and public interests. Moreover,
since the costs to establish and maintain an organized group and the incidence
of free-riders are likely to increase as the number of potential members
increases, public choice theory also predicts that relatively small numbers of
persons with common interests are more likely to be represented by organized
interest groups than large numbers ofpersons with common interests." In the
field of tax policy, these considerations suggest that relatively small groups
of taxpayers with common interests are much more likely to exercise political
influence through organized interest groups than large groups of taxpayers
with more diffuse interests."
4. Public Policy and Political Efficiency
The motivations and constraints that public choice theory assigns to the
central actors in the political process influence not only their expected
behavior within this framework, but also the kinds ofpublic policies that are
organized interest groups).
43. !d. at 61 (observing that this lobbying generally involves the provision of information or
funding); see also MUELLER, supra note 15, at 205 (noting that interest groups "try to increase the welfare
of their membership by reducing candidate uncertainty over how their membership votes").
44. See, e.g., HARTLE, supra note 18, at 61 (referring to "costly publicity campaigns designed to
convince tens ofthousands ofvoters to support a desired caudidateor party on a desired policy decision.");
Hartle, supra note 24, at 414 (emphasizing the "capacity ofspecial interest groups to influence the mass
media").
45. OLSON, supra note 41, at 15.
46. See, e.g., id. at 46-52 (describing large unorganized interest groups as "latent" groups).
47. See, e.g-, Banting, supra note 9, at 353; Hartle, supra note 24, at 413-15 (emphasizing the
influence of narrow and special interest groups in tax policy).
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likely to maximize political efficiency. Since voters are predicted to be better
informed about matters that touch on their immediate interests and less
knowledgeable about other issues, for example, public choice theory suggests
that political efficiency may be achieved by targeting government benefits to
groups ofvoters who are apt to be well-informed about the benefits that they
receive while distributing the related costs widely among groups ofvoters who
are less likely to perceive the burdens that they bear." The more complex the
nature of the specific policy, moreover, the less likely it is that those who bear
these costs will perceive the burden, lessening further the political costs ofthe
policy," Differential transaction costs and collective action problems suggest
a similar strategy for politically efficient public policies, involving the
conferral ofbenefits on selected groups ofvoters who are well-representedby
organized interest groups, and the allocation of related costs among more
diffuse groups ofvoters for whom the fmancial and organizational barriers to
collective political action are much greater." As a result, as Mancur Olson
emphasized, differential information and organizational costs create "a
systematic tendency for 'exploitation' ofthe great by the smallr'51
B. Political Efficiency and Tax Policy
If voters regard benefits from government expenditures as utility
enhancing and taxes as utility reducing, the pursuit of political efficiency
suggests that governments will attempt to maximize the political benefits from
spending programs and minimize the political costs from the taxes necessary
to finance these programs." For a given level of government expenditure,
therefore, a politically efficient revenue structure will minimize the political
costs associated with each tax-s-utilizing each revenue source, as one theorist
explains, "up to the point at which the marginal political cost is equal for all
such sources.''" Overtime, moreover, a tendency toward political efficiency
suggests that governments will increase and decrease tax rates on specific
48. See, e.g., HARTLE, supra note I S, at 67.
49. See, e.g., id. at 67-68.
50. See, e.g., id.
51. OLSON, supra note 41, at 29.
52. GILLESPlE,supra note 12, at 17. JeanBaptiste Colbert made asirmlarpoint long ago, explaining
that "[t]he art oftaxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount offeathers with
the least amount of hissing." SUZY PLAIT, RESPECTFULLYQuOTED: A DICT10NARY OF QUOTATIONS
REQUESTEDFROMTHEeONG RESSIONAL RESEARCHSERVICE(1989), available athttp://www.bartleby.com
173J17SS.html.
53. GILLESPlE,supra note 12, at 18.
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revenue sources as relative political costs change, introduce new taxes when
the political costs ofso doing are less than the political costs from increasing
the rate of an existing tax, and repeal old taxes when their political costs
exceed those associated with other taxes.S4 The key questions for a public
choice theory of tax policy, therefore, concern the factors that affect the
political costs of different taxes and the reasons why these political costs
change over time.
Beginning with the factors affecting the political costs ofdifferent taxes,
many can be identified." Most obviously, perhaps. the political costs of a tax
can be expected to increase as its rate increases, since organized opposition
to the tax is increasingly cost-justified as tax burdens increase." The same
reason also suggests that the political costs of a tax will increase as the costs
to comply with the tax increase." Political costs are also likely to increase as
costs to administer the tax increase, since diminished net revenues attributable
to higher administrative costs necessitate higher tax rates or other taxes to
maintain revenues-both of which involve political costs." Conversely, the
political costs of a tax tend to be lower where the number of taxpayers is
large, since the burden is spread widely and the costs oforganized opposition
substantial." As the number of taxpayers affected by an established tax
increases, however, political costs can be expected to increase because groups
opposing the tax are likely to attract new members."
Other important determinants of the political costs of taxes include
vertical tax competition (the occupation of the same revenue source by
54. ld.
55. For more general discussions, see id. at 20~32; HARTLE, supra note 22, at 41-54. The factors
considered in the Hartle text are by no means comprehensive, omitting, for example, several factors
discussed in GILLESPIE, supra note 12. Indeed, Gillespie himselfemphasizes that ''[t]here may 'M:1l be.
determinants of political costs" other than those that he identifies, and explains that "[tjhe model is general
enough to pennittheappropriate adaptations." ld. at 31. Forthepurpose ofthis article, Idtscuss only those
factors that seem most relevant to the decline and abolition of wealth transfer taxes, particularly in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.
56. GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 21. To the extent that adverse economic consequences associated
with different taxes increase as rates increase, this effect is a further reason why the political costs ofa tax
are likely to increase as its rate increases.
57. Id. at 29-30; HARTI.E, supra note 22, at 52 (observing that higbercompliance costs "can be
thought of as an increase in the tax burden").
58. GILLESJ'IE, supra note 12, at 29-30; HARTI.E, supra note 22, at 52.
59. GILLESPIE,supra note 12, at22-23; HARTI.E, supra note 22, at 48. The political costs ofa tax
may also be reduced by introducing concessions for narrow and special interest groups who are generally
weU-infurmed about taxes that affect them and already represented by organized interest groups. On the
politically efficient use of tax concessions, see HARTI.E, supra note 22, at 37-39.
60. GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 22·23.
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different levels ofgovernment in a federal system), horizontal tax competition
(the pursuit of mobile revenue sources by different national or sub-national
governments),and base elasticity (the extent to which revenues automatically
increase with economic growth). In principle, the occupation of a revenue
source by one level of government tends to increase the political cost of its
imposition by another level ofgovernment. Because at least some organized
opposition to the tax is likely to exist already, the collection of tax by the
second government increases the effective rate of the tax, and the first
government itselfcan be expectedto oppose the measure." Political costs are
also high for mobile revenue sources, since those subject to the tax may
threaten to or actually relocate these sources to jurisdictions with lower taxes,
thereby depriving the higher-tax jurisdiction of revenue and economic
activity." Base elasticity, on the other hand, decreases the political costs of
a tax, since economic growth allows govermnents to increase spending
without having to increase effective tax rates."
A final factor affecting the political costs of taxes is what W. Irwin
Gillespie describes as "tax preference't-c-a preference for one kind of tax
versus another notwithstanding that amounts owing under each tax would be
identical." While different tax preferences might turn on compliance costs or
other nonrevenue impacts," they might also depend on judgments about the
appropriateness or fairness of alternative revenue sources." As Gillespie
explains, a preference for one tax over another "could arise because one
revenue source is judged by citizens to be the product of their own,
meritorious efforts (say, labor income), whereas another revenue source is
judged not to be the result ofhard work (say, an inheritance, a gift or a lottery
61. !d. at 27-28; see also HARTtE, supra note 22, at 49 (explaining that governments are likely to
oppose occupation of the same revenue source by another level of government because "taxpayers may
incorrectly assign the 'blame' to the 'wrong' government; second, taxpayer opposition probably mounts
exponentially as effective rates rise on a given base [so that] the political costs offuture revenue increases
by the 'prior' occupant are raised even further; [and] thirdly, with higher tax rates evasion and avoidance
becomes increasingly attractive and enforcement costs are raised").
62. GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 28-29.
63. Id. at 30.
64. ld. at 26 [hypothesizing that voters ''may not be indifferent between two revenue sources, for
each of which the tax per dollar's worth of tax base could be equal for a given taxpayer").
65. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that different tax preferences "could arise because verification of one
revenue source interferes more directly in the conduct of a citizen's affairs (say, a direct tax on incomes,
compared with an indirect tax on imports)").
66. ld. at 27 (noting that voters may be less politically opposed to taxes that are perceived to be fair
than they are to taxes that are perceived to be unfair).
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win}?" Alternatively, he suggests, different tax preferences might exist
"because one revenue source is judged by taxpayers to have unhealthy,
immoral or sinful connotations (expenditures on alcoholic beverages and
tobacco products), whereas the connotations of another revenue source are
seen as healthy, moral or meritorious (expenditures on milk, footwear and
clothing for children and expenditures on charitable donations). ,>68 Whatever
the reasons for these tax preferences, the political cost to introduce, maintain,
or increase a tax. for which a large number ofvoters have a lower preference
will be greater than the political cost to introduce, maintain, or increase a tax
for which a large number ofvoters have a greater tax preference."
Having identified some ofthe key factors affecting the political costs of
different taxes, it is possible to speculate on various reasons why these
political costs might change over time. Changes in government expenditures,
for example, are likely to affect the political costs oftaxes-increasingthese
costs where rates are increased or exemptions reduced in order to finance
increased spending, and decreasing these costs where spending reductions
allow taxes to be cut. Actions by other governments can also affect the
political costs ofdifferent taxes-increasing these costs where other levels of
government introduce or increase taxes on the same revenue source, but
decreasing these costs where neighboring governments at the same level
introduce or increase taxes on the same revenue source. Another reason why
the political costs ofdifferent taxes might change involves broader economic
changes, as increasing economic integration has undoubtedly increased the
political costs of taxes on mobile revenue sources. Inflation can also increase
the political costs of a tax, ifexemptions are not indexed or adjusted to offset
their declining real value. Finally, ideological shifts are likely to change the
political costs of different taxes to the extent that they influence people's
preferences for different kinds of taxes. For public choice theories of
politicallyefficient revenue structures, however, the reasons for changes in the
political costs ofdifferent taxes are considered exogenous and not themselves
subjects of inquiry.
67. Id. at 26.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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III. WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA,
AND NEW ZEALAND
85
Wealth transfer taxes were first introduced in the Australian colonies and
New Zealand in the second half of the nineteenth century" and by all
Canadian provinces between the years 1892and 1903." InAustraliaandNew
Zealand, these taxes were generally based on the estates ofpersons domiciled
in the taxing jurisdiction, though Queensland and South Australia opted for
succession duties with rates and exemptions applied to amounts received by
beneficiaries," and New Zealand's tax depended both on the size ofthe estate
and the degree of consanguinity between the beneficiary and the deceased."
In Canada, the constitutional restrictionon provincial taxingpowers to "Direct
Taxation within the Province'?' meant that provinces limited their deathduties
to property situated within the province upon the death of the owner, and to
property situated outside the province only if the deceased was domiciled in
the province and the beneficiary was a resident of or domiciled in the
70. On the early history of death duties in the Australian colonies, see JULIEP. SMITH,TAXING
POPULARITY: THESTORY OFTAXATION INAUSTRALLA 16-18 (1993). For a history of'theeatatetax in New
Zealand, see L McKay,Historica/Aspectsojthe Estate Tax, 8 N.Z.U. L. REv. I (1978). In Australia, New
South Wales enacted the first death duty in 1851. Tasmania followed in 1865, Victoria in 1870, South
Australia in 1876, Queensland in 1886, and WestemAustralia in 1895. In New Zealand, a tax on estates
was first intreduced in 1866. Id. at 1.
7L I J. H....RVEY PERRY, TAXES, TAlUFFS, & SUBSIDIES: A HISTORY OF CANADIAN FISCAL
DEVELOPMENT 108-09 (1955);see a/so George E. Carter, Federal Abandonment ofthe Estate Tax: The
Intergovernmental Fiscal Dimension, 21 CAN. TAX1. 232, 233 (1973). Ontario was the first Canadian
province to introduce a succession duty, which was modeled closely after similar legislation enacted a few
years earlier in the States ofNew York and Pennsylvania. RA. BAYLY, SUCCESSION DUTYINCANADA 10
(1902). Later that year, succession duties were also introduced in Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova
Scotia. Manitoba enacted a succession duty in 1893, and British Columbia and Prince Edward Island
followed the next year. Id. Alberta and Saskatchewan introduced similar levies in 1903 under the
Northwest Territories Ordinance. Id.
72. Peter Saunders, An Australian Perspective on Wealth Taxation, in TAXATION isSUESOFTHE
I980s, at 398 (John G. Head ed., 1983). In South Australia, legislators favored the latter approach on the
grounds that "a man should leave his property to several persons instead of one only ... .: PARL.DEB.
1893, I, 342, quoted in STEPHEN MILLS,TAXATION INAUSTRALIA 140 (I925).
73. McKay, supra note 70, at 1. In 1881, the legislature abandoned the succession dutybasis of the
tax, adopting a pure estate-type tax with an exemption and progressive rates based on the size ofthe estate.
In 1909, however, a succession duty was reintroduced to operate in tandem with the estate tax. Jd.at 34.
74. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, § 92 (U.K.), s. 92(2).
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province." Rates were determined both by the value of the estate and by the
relationship between the deceased and the beneficiary."
In each ofthese jurisdictions, wealth transfer taxes were the first major
direct taxes to be imposed, marking a major departure from an earlier era in
which governments were financed almost entirely from customs duties and
excise taxes." Although the introduction ofthese taxes reflected an important
political shift from regressive indirect taxes to progressive direct taxes,78 their
primary rationale appears to have been to raise revenue." In Australia,
revenues from estate duties exceeded 30% oftotal state tax revenues in 1909
and 1910,80 and continued to account for a significant share of state tax
revenues until the late 19605.8\ In Canada, provincial succession duties
accounted for almost 40% ofprovincial tax revenues in 1913,82 and remained
substantial contributors to provincial finances until 1946, when most
provinces ceded occupancy ofthis field to the federal government." In New
75. Carter, supra note7l, at233. For asummaryofthe leading constitutional cases that shaped the
evolution ofprovincial succession duties in Canada, see G.V. LAFOREST, CANADIAN TAXPAPER No. 65,
THEALLOCATIONOFTAXINOPOWER UNDER THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 106-09 (2ded. 1981). For a
more detailed analysis of the impact of Canadian constitutional law on the design of these succession
duties, see WolfeD. Goodman,Provincial Wealth Taxes, in REpORT OFPROCEEDINGS OFTHETwENTY-
THIRD TAXCONFERENCE 29 (1972) (contending that provincial succession duties could have applied to all
amountsreceived by beneficiaries resident or domiciled in theprovince without violating theconstitutional
provision limiting provincial taxing powers). That provincial succession duties could alsoapplyto amounts
received by resident beneficiaries regardless ofthe domicile or residenceofthedeceased, was subsequently
established inEllet'sEstate v.Attorney-GeneralofBritish Columbia, (1980] 2 S.C.R. 466, available at
1980 N.R.lEXIS 1408.
76. Carter,supra note 71, at 233.
77. SMITH, supra note 70, at 16; Philipps, supra note 9, at 91.
78. SMITH,SUpra note 70, at 16; Philipps, supra note 9, at 93-94 (contending that political agitation
for direct taxation wasmuch more muted in Canada than in the United States).
79. PERRY, supra note 71, at 109 (referring to Canada); SM1TH, supra note 70, at 17 (referring to
Australia); McKay, supra note 70, at 1 (referring to New Zealand).
80. Calculated from figures in RL. MATHEWS & W.R.C. JAY, FEDERAL FINANCE;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCiAL RELAnONS INAUSTRALIA SINCE FEDERATION 83 tbl.l1 (1972).
81. Although the contribution ofestate duties 10state tax revenues decreased to 15.1% in 1918-19,
12.0% in 1928-29, and 7.6% in 1938-39, this share increased to 24.1% in 1948-49 (after the states
abandoned their income taxes to the Commonwealtb Government during the Second World War), and
exceeded 18% in 1958-59 and 16% in 1968-69. Calculated from figures inM. at 100, 166, 194, 230, 247,
tbls.14, 21, 24, 34, 38. For a breakdown among different states in the years after the Second World War,
see Saunders, supra note 72, at 398-99.
82. Calculated from figures in PERRY, supra note 71, at 123 tbl.vfl.
83. The contribution ofsuccession duties to provincial lax revenues was almost 30% in 1937 and
over 20% in 1946, but declined thereafter to 6.9% in 1949,4.8% in 1959,and 2.0% in 1969. Calculated
from figures in STATISTICS CANADA, HlSTORICAL STATISTICS OFCANADA § H tbI.H92-112, available at
bttp:llwww.statcan.calenglish/freepublIl-516-XIElsectionh/H92_112.csv. While succession duties
obviously accounted for a larger share of tax revenues in those provinces that collected their own taxes
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Zealand, the estate tax accounted for 13.5% ofgovernment revenues in 1915,
but declined thereafter,"
Revenue considerations were also central to the decision of the
Commonwealth Government in Australia to enact a national estate duty in
1914, and the decision of the federal govenunent in Canada to enact a
succession duty in 1941. In Australia, estate duty and income tax were
enacted in order to help finance participation in the First World War, after
revenues from customs and excise duties collapsed due to the disruption of
trade." In Canada, where a federal income tax was enacted primarily for
revenue reasons during the First World War,86 the main justification by
Minister ofFinance J.L. Ilsley forthe introduction ofafederal succession duty
was "the compelling need for revenue" to fight the Second World War.87 At
the same time, he emphasized, since the provinces had «not fully occupied"
the field, there was "room for an additional and independent dominion tax" as
a permanent source of federal revenue," As a percentage of total tax
revenues, however, federal wealth transfer taxes in Australia and Canada were
never very large, accounting for only two to four percent of federal tax
revenues in Australia from 1914 to 1940 and no more than 1.4% of federal tax
revenues in the post-war period," and contributing no more than 1.7% of
federal tax revenues in Canada."
(Ontario and Quebec until 1963 and British Columbia thereafter), the relative role of these taxes also
declined in the postwar period, falling to 9.2% in Ontario and 6.1% in Quebec in 1958-59; and 32% in
British Columbia, 2.7% in Ontario. and 2.4% in Quebec in 1968-69. Calculated from figures in CAN.TAX
FOUND., PROVINCIAL FINANCES 1969, at 207, 211, 224 tbls.53, 55, 63 (1969).
84. As a percentage of total government revenue, the estate lax declined to 9.1% in 1925, 8.8% in
1935,4.6% in 1945,4.0% in 1955, 2.5% in 1965, and 1.4% in 1975. McKay, supra note 70, at21 tbl.I.
By 1985, the share of tax revenues represented by the estate tax fell to 0.2%. a.E.C.D., supra note 3.
85. MATlrnws&JA-c.supra note 80; SMITH,supra note 70, at45. Although the estate duty included
gifts made within a year of death, a separate gift tax was not enacted until 1942.
86. On the origins ofthe federal income tax in Canada, see Richard Krever, The Origin a/Federal
Income Taxation in Canada, 3 CAN.TAX'N 170 (1981).
87. IL. Ils1ey, Minister ofFin., Budget Speech, Address Before the Canadian House ofComrnons
(Apr. 29, 1941 ),published by King's Printer, 1941, at 16 (adding that "[d]eath duties, in general, are a very
good typeof tax, second only to income tax in their essential fairness and the possibilities ofadjusting them
progressively to ability to pay"). The succession duty was based partly on the share ofthe estate received
by each beneficiary, partly on the size ofthe estate, and partly on the relationship between the beneficiary
and the deceased. In 1958, this tax was replaced by an estate tax with progressive rates based solely on the
aggregate value of the estate. A gift tax had been introduced in 1935, primarily to discourage income-
splitting under the federal income tax. RM. BIRD& M.W. BUCOVETSKY, CANADIAN TAXPAPERNo. 58,
CANADIAN TAXREFORM AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 35 (1976).
88. Ilsley,supra note 87, at 16.
89. Saunders, supra note 72, at 398-99.
90. Figures calculated from STATISTICS CANADA, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF CANADA § H
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In Australia, the introduction of the national estate duty led to a lengthy
period in which the Commonwealth and State Governments jointly occupied
the wealth transfer tax field. Despite recurring proposals to allocate this
revenue source solely to the States," or solely to the Commonwealth
Government," jointoccupancy continued until the taxes were repealed at both
levels of government in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, although the
Commonwealth and State Governments cooperated to some extent in the
administration of these taxes," Australia's "double or duplicative" wealth
transfer tax system was a source of considerable complexity and high
compliance and administration costs."
In Canada, completejoint occupancy lasted only from 1942 to 1946, after
which all provinces but Ontario and Quebec agreed to withdraw from the
collection of succession duties as well as personal and corporate income
taxation in return for unconditional grants from the federal government." In
order to relieve the estates of decedents in Ontario and Quebec from the
combined burden of federal and provincial taxes, the federal succession duty
was amended to provide a credit for provincial succession duties up to 50%
ofthe federal tax otherwise payable." In 1957, the unconditional grant system
tbI.H75-91, available at http://www.statcan.calenglishifreepublll-516-XIEJsectionhlH75_91.csv.
91. At the Premiers' Conference in 1926, for example, the Commonwealth proposed to vacate the
estate duty and other revenue sources to the states in exchange fur the abolition ofper capita grants. The
states rejected the proposal for a number of reasons, including the absence of any guarantee that a
subsequent Commonwealth Government would not re-euter the field. MATHEWS & JAY,supra note 80, at
120. Likewise, in 1974, the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations
recommended that the Commonwealth Government vacate the field of estate and gift duty, subject to the
states agreeing on uniform legislation and rates of duty. Willard R Pedrick, Ok, to Die Down Under!
Abolition a/Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 TAXLAw. 113, 118 (1981).
92. In 1975, for example, the Taxation Review Committee (also known as the Asprey Committee)
recommended a single national estate and gift duty administered by the Commonwealth Government, with
a portion ofrevenues shared with the states based on "the domicile of deceased persons and donors within
the State and property within the State of deceased persons and donors domiciled outside Australia."
TAXATION REVIEW COMM., Futr, REpORT JANUARY 31 1975 "11 24.74 (1975), available at http://
purl.library.usydedu.aulsetislidlp00087.
93. Saunders, supra note 72, at 400.
94. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 119; see also TAXATION REVIEW COMM., supra note 92, '[ 24.71
(acknowledging criticism of the death duties then in force "on grounds of the complexity of separate
Commonwealth and State taxes and the considerable costs in administration and compliance that result");
perer Grcenewegen, Options/ortke Taxation a/Wealth, 2 AUSTL. TAXFo!l.UM 305, 315 (1985) (attributing
the unpopularity of death duties in Australia in part to "theirhigh compliance costs for taxpayers, the size
of which was strongly influenced by the fact that death duties were a major area of Federal-State
duplication").
95. Carter,supra note 71, at 235.
96. Id. at 235-37 (explaining that the credit did not always relieve the combined burden of both
taxes).
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was replaced by a series ofagreements under which most provinces continued
to relinquish succession duties to the federal government in exchange for
"rental payments" equal to 50% offederal collections ofsuccession duties in
each province." In Ontario and Quebec, which refused to "rent" their
succession duties to the federal government, the federal tax was reduced in the
form of a 50% abatement that replaced the former tax credit." In 1964,
British Columbia withdrew from this "tax rental agreement" and began to
collect its own succession duty, receiving the same abatement as was available
in Ontario and 'Quebec." The next year, federal rental payments fOI. this
revenue source were increased to 75%, with a corresponding increase in the
abatement allowed under the federal tax."? While British Columbia increased
its succession duty to take full advantage of this abatement, Ontario and
Quebec left their succession duties unchanged, opting to receive rental
payments equal to 25% offederal collections in their provinces.'?' As a result,
while federal-provincial agreements simplified the collection of wealth
transfer taxes in seven of ten Canadian provinces, the combination offederal
and provincial taxes in the remaining three was as complicated and
"duplicative" as the system in Australia. More importantly, perhaps, the
federal government's agreement to return 75% of federal wealth transfer tax
revenues to the province where the tax was collected (or to abate the federal
tax by up to 75% where a province collected its own tax) might be expected
to significantly weaken its connnitment to the tax. As the following sections
demonstrate, however, complexity and revenue yield are only two of many
reasons why wealth transfer taxes were abolished in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand.
A. The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes in Canada
The specific events leading to the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in
Canada began somewhat innocuously with the appointment of a Royal
Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission) in 1962, unfolded at the
federal level between 1967 and 1971 as the federal government responded to
97. !d. at236 (adding that these revenues were supplemented by an "equalization feature: the yields
from the three 'standard' taxes were to be equalized to raise the per-capita yields in any province up to the
per-capita yield in the two provinces having the highest per-capita yields").
98. Id. (emphasizing that "[tjhe substitution of the abatement fora tax credit, then, amounted to a
change merely in form, not in substance").
99. ld. at 238.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 238 n.26.
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the Report of the Carter Commission, and continued at the provincial level
over the following fourteen years. This section examines each of these
phases.
1. The Carter Commission: 1962-1967
PromisedbyProgressive-Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker
in the opening speech of his 1962 election campaign.f" an independent
commission had long been favored by tax professionals and business leaders
as a vehicle to reduce progressive rates, simplify administration and
enforcement, and address technical anomalies in the income tax.'?' When the
Progressive-Conservative Party formed a minority government after the
election, Diefenbaker announced the appointment of a Royal Commission
comprisingmainly professionals and businesspersons and chaired by Toronto
accountant Kenneth Carter. 104 The Carter Commission's terms ofreference
were extremely broad, involving a review of all aspects of federal taxation
including "income, sales and excise taxes and estate duties." 05
Given its origins and its membership, there was every reason to expect
that the Commission would affirm the prevailing "tax orthodoxy" ofbusiness
and professional commentators that taxes were too high, that indirect sales or
value-added taxes should be considered as alternatives to high income taxes,
and that wealth transfer taxes were causing Canadian family businesses to be
sold to foreigners.!" Indeed, submissions to the Commission, most ofwhich
were from the same business and professional interests which had pushed for
its establishment,'?' tended to repeat these views in more technical form.''"
102. Editorial, The Vital Pledge, GLOBE& MAn. (Toronto), May 7, 1962, at A6.
103. See LesMacDonald, Why the Carter Commission Had to Be Stopped, in THEQUESTFORTAX
REFORM, supra note 24, at 351, 351-53. The main technical issues involved the characterization ofisolated
transactions as taxable business income or nontaxable capital gains, and "surplus stripping" transactions
designed to convert taxable dividends into nontaxable capital gains. 1d.
104. Ofthe six members ofthe Commission, three were "acknowledged authoritiesin lax circles, wi1h
impeccable professional and business connections," one wasa lawyer and General Manager ofthe Nova
Scotia Trust Company, another was Treasurer of the National Council of Women and bad previously
managed the Western Canadian branch of an insurance finn, and the last was Manager of the British
Columbia Federation ofAgriculture and an Executive Director ofthe Canadian Federation ofAgriculture.
MacDonald, supra note 103, at 353.
105. Order in Council, P.C. 1962-1334 (Sept. 25, 1962), reprinted in 1 REpORTOF THEROYAL
COMMISSION ONTAXATlON, at v (1966).
106. MacDonald, supra note 103, at 354.
107. According to one commentator, over half of the submissions to the Commission came from
business organizations while less than five percent were from labor and employee organizations. Robert
Gardner, Tax RefQT11l and Class Interests: TheFateofProgressive Refonn, 1967-72,3 CAN. TAX'N 245,
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According to the Shoe Manufacturers' Association of Canada, for example,
"[t]he unreasonably high level ofsuccession duties has been the largest single
factor both in encouraging the sell-out of Canadian enterprises to foreign
interests and in eliminating from the economic scene continuing independent
family businesses."!" The Canadian Bar Association decried the "excessive
amount ofproperty" that was tied up for long periods oftime in trusts to avoid
wealth transfer taxes, concluding that these arrangements "frequently restrict
the company's properdevelopment and expansion and may addto production
coste."!" On the basis of these and other submissions, Canada's leading
financial newspaper concluded that "the economic damage" caused by these
taxes was "staggering."111
As well as accepting submissions, the Commission embarked on an
ambitious research program, lasting four years and costing approximately
CA$4,OOO,OOO.112 Among 27 research studies, one found no evidence that the
estate tax was a major factor in the sale of small businesses.!" Others
challengedthe nontaxation ofcapital gains, whichwere traditionally excluded
from the source concept ofincome that Canada had borrowed from the United
Kingdom.'!" Another study examined the incidence of taxation in Canada,
concluding that the tax system as a whole was regressive for at least the
poorest third of Canadian families and possibly more.!" After much delay,
and two intervening elections resulting in Liberal minority governments, the
Commission's six-volume Report was finally released in February 1967.
Of the Commission's many recommendations, the most central was its
conclusion that «taxes should be allocated according to the changes in the
economic power ofindividuals and families."!" Emphasizing that "[t]he first
246 n.9 (1981). For a list of submissions received by the Commission, see 1 REpORT OFTHE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TAXATION, supra note 105,at 121-30.
108. MacDonald, supra note 103, at 354.
109. The Dead Hand ofDeath Duties, FIN.POST (Can.), Feb. I, 1964, at AI.
110. u.
Ill. Id.
112. John G. Head, Evolution ofthe Canadian Tax Reform, I DALHOUSIEL.J. 51, 52 (1973).
113. John G. Smith et at, Death Taxes, in STUDIES OFTHE ROYAL COMMiSSION ONTAXATION 18-20
(No. 11, 1964).
114. Geoffrey R. Conway & John G. Smith, The Taxation of Capital Gains, in STUDIES OFTHE
ROYAL COMMISSION ONTAXATiON (No. 19, 1967); Douglas J. Sherbaniuk, The Concept ofIncome-The
Receipts Side, in STTJDIES OFTHE ROYAL COMMiSSION ONTAXATiON (No. 20, 1967).
115. W. Irwin Gillespie, The Incidence ofTaxes and PublicExpenditures in the Canadian Economy,
in STUDIES OFTHE ROYAL COMMiSSION ONTAXATiON (No.2, 1964).
116. 1 REPORT OFTHE ROYAL COMMiSSiON ONTAXATION, supra note 105, at 9; see a/so 3 REpORT
OFTHE ROYAL COMMiSSiON ONTAXATiON 39 (1966) (suggesting that taxes should be based on "the sum
ofthe market value ofgoods and services consumed or given away in the taxation year by the tax unit, plus
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and most essential purpose oftaxation is to share the burden ofthe state fairly
among all individuals and families,"!" a majority of the Commissioners
rejected any distinction among different sources of changes to a taxpayer's
economic power,ua proposing a "comprehensive tax base" accordingto which
"all the net gains ... ofeach tax unit" should be subject to tax "on an annual
basis,'?" Among the implications of this approach, gifts and inheritances
would be included in the comprehensive tax base for the year in which they
were received,120 and capital gains and losses would befully recognized on an
accrual basis irrespective ofany sale."! For administrative reasons, however,
the Commission retreated from accrual treatment for capital gains and losses,
recommending instead that these gains and losses should be recognized on a
realization basis, as well as when property is transferred by way of gift or on
death.!" Since gifts and inheritances would be included in the recipient's
income, the Commission also recommended that separate wealth transfer taxes
should be repealed.':" Other key recommendations included the introduction
of a family tax unit (including dependent childrenj.!" a reduction in the top
marginal rate from 80% to 50%,125 the complete integration of corporate and
personal income taxes,':" and a dramatic reduction in tax concessions for
income from mineral and petroleum extraction!"
the annual change in the market value of the assets held by the unit''). Tn adopting this approach, the
Commission was obviously inspired by the broad definitions of income formulated by U.S. economists
Robert Haig and Henry Simons. See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept ofIncome, in THE FEDERAL
lNCOMETAX27 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921) (defining income as "the money value ofthe net accretion
to economic power between two points oftime"); SIMONS,supra note 13, at 50 (defining personal income
as "the algebraic sum of (l) the market value ofrights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the
value of the store ofproperty rights between the beginning and end ofthe period in question").
117. 1 REpORT01' THE ROYALCOMMISSION ONTAXATlON,supra note 105, at 4.
118. Id. at 9 (emphasizing that ifa person "obtains increased command over goods and services for
his personal satisfaction wedo not believe it matters, from the point ofview oftaxation, whether he earned
it through worlcing, gained it through operating a business, received it because he held property, made it
by selling property or was given it by a relative").
119.3 REpORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, supra note 116, at 39. Two
Commissioners (Beauvais and Grunt) dissented from this recommendation. See 1REpORTOFTHEROYAL
COMMISSION ONTAXATION, supra note 105, at 51-Ill.
120. 3 REPORTOFTHEROYALCOMMISSION ONTAXATrQN, supra note 116, at 41.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 368-80.
123. I REpORTOFTHE ROYALCOMMISSION ONTAXATION, supra note lOS, at 473, 513.
124. !d. at 11749.
125. u. at 153-204.
126. 4 REpORTOFTHEROYALCOMMISSION ONTAXATION, at 3-95 (1966).
127. !d. at 295-376.
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2. Federal Reform: 1967-1971
While the Commission's Report was hailed by leading tax academics as
"a landmark in the annals oftaxation,"!" affluent individuals and the business
and professional interests that pushed for the Commission's formation were
overwhelminglynegative.!" Although areduction in the top marginal rate and
repeal of wealth transfer taxes would provide some benefit for affluent
individuals, this would be more than offset by the full taxation ofcapital gains
and the inclusion of gifts and inheritances in income. While the Report
estimated that 64% of Canadian taxpayers would pay lower taxes under its
proposals, these reductions averaged only about five percent of taxes
otherwise payable and were generally limited to taxpayers with incomes of
less than CA$35,000 in 1964. 130 In contrast, 27,000 taxpayers with incomes
over CA$35,OOO could have expected to pay an additional CA$I,OOO on
average, while an estimated 633 individuals with incomes over CA$300,OOO
could have expected to pay an average ofmore than CA$67,OOO in additional
taxes." 1 The mining industry stood to lose the most, as the Report's proposed
withdrawal of net depletion allowance and a three-year tax holiday were
expected to increase its taxes by more than 1OO% .........-most ofwhich would have
been paid by the fifteen largest companies.!" Not surprisingly, therefore,
mining companies led organized opposition to the Report, threatening the
cessation ofCanadian investments, and enlisting the support ofpremiers from
Western provinces where the extraction industries predominated.I"
At the eud of April 1967, then Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp
announced a timetable to deal with the Report, inviting comments on the
major recommendations by September of that year, and promising a White
Paper incorporating the Government's proposals thereafter and draft
legislation to be enacted by the end of 1968. 134 Within two weeks, however,
Sharp responded to pressure from the mining industry by guaranteeing that the
128. Arnold C. Herberger, A Landmark in the Annals of Taxation, I CAN. J. ECON. 183 (Supp. I
1968); see also Head, supra note 112, at 52.
129. Gardner, supra note 107, at 246 n.9; see also Meyer Bucovetsky & Richard M. Bird, Tax
Reform in Canada: A Progress Report, 25NAT'L TAXJ. IS, 17-18 (1975);Head,supranote 112, at 58-59.
130. 6 REpORTOf'TBEROYAL COMMISSION ONTAXATION 62 tb1.36-7 (1966) (on file with author).
131. MacDonald, supra note 103, at 360.
132. 6 REpORTOFTHEROYAL COMMISSION ONTAXATION, supra note 130, at 96, 121.
133. See, e.g., Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 129, at 17-18; Gardner, supra note 107, at 249.
134. Han. Mitchell Sharp, Tax Reform-The Fiscal Context, Address at the Banquet of the
Nineteenth Tax Conference (Apr. 24, 1967), in REpORTOF PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH TAX
CONFERENCE 473 (1967).
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three-year tax exemption for new mines would remain until the end of 1973,
whatever decisions were made on the basis of the Report of the Royal
Commission.!" Byautunm 1967, Sharp had received over a thousand
responses, including 150 substantial submissions, mostly from corporations
and business and professional organizations, and mostly critical.':" While
many of these submissions opposed the withdrawal of special tax
preferences.!" considerable criticism was also directed at the Commission's
emphasis on fairness as "the first and most essential purpose oftaxation" and
at the comprehensive tax base in particular. Imperial Oil, for example,
opposed the "sacrifice of economic growth to the commission's concept of
equity."!" The Trust Companies Association warned that the inclusion of
gifts and inheritances in the income tax base "would remove a major incentive
for Canadians to work and produce for the benefit of their families" resulting
in a "very large annual disappearance ofprivate capital."!"
The Government's first official response to the Report came on
November 30, 1967, when the Minister ofFinance tabled the federal budget.
Identifying as common concerns in the submissions that he had received both
the uncertain impact of such far-reaching reforms and the need to attract
foreign capital, Sharp announced that whatever proposals the Government
would "place before parliament and the public in the form of a White Paper
and ultimately in draft legislation" would "undoubtedly be influenced" by the
Report of the Commission, but "will be more in the nature of reforms to the
existing tax structure rather than the adoption of a radically different
approach."140 In other words, the Government would adopt a more piecemeal
approach to tax reform, rather than the comprehensive framework adopted by
the Commission. Before any more specific proposals could be formulated,
however, the Government was thrown intotunnoil when then Prime Minister
135. House ofCommons Debates (May 11, 1967) at III (Hon. Mitchell Sharp) (on file with author)
(assuring that "should the government decide to propose the removal of this incentive, it would not do so
in a manner that would remove the exemption with respect to income earned before January 1, 1974, nor
would it in any essential manner change the method of application of that exemption before that date").
136. Gardner, supra note 107, at 248.
137. For example, over one hundred protesting submissions were made by the oil industry alone.
Graham Hodgson, More than 100 Oil Industry Briefs Oppose Recommendations ofCarter Tax Report,
GLOBE & MAIL(Toronto), Sept. 26, 1967, at Bl.
138. Imperial Oil Ltd., Submission to the Minister ofFinance Regarding TheRecommendations of
the Royal Commission on Taxation (Sept. 1967), at A-IO, quoted in Gardner, supra note 107, at 248.
139. Canadian Tax Foundation, April 1967 Conference, Toronto, 1967, at 460, quoted in Gardner,
supra note 107, at 250.
140. House ofCommons Debates (Nov. 30, 1967) at 4906 (Hon. Mitchell Sharp).
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Lester Pearson announced his intention to resign in December 1967 and a
leadership race and federal election intervened."!
With anew Liberal Government under Prime MinisterPierre Trudeau, the
promised White Paper was predictably delayed. In April 1968, the new
Finance Minister Edgar Benson announced a change in the Government's tax
reform schedule, explaining that major reforms would not be presented until
some time in 1969.142 In the interim, however, the Government signaled its
rejection ofthe Commission's comprehensive tax base by introducing major
revisions to the federal gift and estate taxes in the October 1968 federal
budget: exempting inter-spousal transfers, integrating these taxes in the form
ofa cumulativeprogressive tax, and increasing rates on estates valued at less
than CA$5,OOO,OOO. 143 Defending the continued existence of a separate gift
and estate tax, the Finance Minister explained that he respected "the
intellectual coherence and elegance" of the Commission's recommendation,
but that "the overwhelming weight ofCanadian opinion is against it now, and
many Canadian practices and institutions would be seriously disrupted if we
embraced this proposal."!"
Not surprisingly, given the increased impact on small and medium-sized
estates, the amendments to the gift and estate tax generated considerable
political opposition, particularly from owners of small businesses and family
farms who had played a relatively minor role in opposition to the Royal
Commission Report.':" In Western Canada, where fanning interests were
particularly strong, the Provincial Governments ofAlberta and Saskatchewan
responded to this sector by refunding the provincial share of the federal estate
141. As a contender in the race for leadership of the Liberal Party, Sharp insisted that he was in no
position to take a public stance on tax reform. Hartle, supra note 24, at 412. Before the leadership
campaign came to an end, however, Sharp withdrew in favor ofPierre Trudeau, who became Liberal leader
and Prime Minister on April 6, 1968. Under Trudeau, the Liberals called a federal election for June 25,
1968, which they won handily and formed a majority government
142. Head, supra note 112, at 61.
143. An Act to amend the Income Tax Act and the Estate Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 33 (1968-69) (on file
with author); see, e.g., CAN.TAXFOUND.,REpORTOFPROCEEDINGS OFTwENTY-FIRSTTAXCONFERENCE
1968, at 72 (1969) (comments of Michael B. Jameson, including Proposed Estate Tax Changes).
144. House afCommons Debates (Oct. 22, 1967) at 1685 (Hon. Edgar Benson).
145. Gardner,supra note 107,at251;see a/sa Richard M. Bird, Canada's Vanishing Death Taxes,
16 OSGOODEHAuL.J.133, 137(197&) (observing that the amendments to the federal gift and estate taxes
"gave rise to considerable public outcry, to the point where it appears the whole experience may have made
the government particularly cautious in this area when designing its major tax refonn over the next few
years").
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tax to estates from which it had been collected.':" In these two provinces,
therefore, estate taxes were effectively reduced by 75%.
In this context, the long-awaited White Paper was finally released on
November 7, 1969.147 Although explicitly rejecting the Carter Commission's
comprehensive tax base,':" as well as several other proposals such as family
taxation':" and the elimination of all resource tax incentives/50 the White
Paper agreed with the Commission Report that, as a general rule, capitalgains
should be fully taxable at ordinary rates.':" In order to prevent the concurrent
application ofcapital gains tax and estate tax "at a most inconvenient time,"
however, the White Paper rejected the Cotrnnission's proposal that capital
gains should be recognized when property is transferred at death,
recommending instead that "the person who inherits the assets be treated as
ifhe had purchased them at their cost to the deceased" plus "part of the death
taxes paid on the assets in question-the part that relates to the capital
gain. "iS2 In the case of gifts, though, the White Paper recommended that
capital gains be taxable in the year ofthe gift and that the person receiving the
property be treated "as if he had purchased the asset for its fair market
value."!" Finally, and unexpectedly, the White Paper recommended that
shareholders in widely-held Canadian corporations should be required to
recognize accrued gains and losses every five yeara-c-though only halfofthese
gains and losses would be recognized for tax purposes.':"
146. CAN. TAXFOUND., supra note 83, at 58. In Alberta, this legislation came into effect on
March 30, 1967. In Saskatchewan, refunds commenced on April 1,1969. In its 1969 budget, the
Government of Manitoba announced that it would also introduce legislation to refund the provincial share
of the federal estate taxunless the federal government resolved the "competition for economic advantage"
satisfactorily. Millie Goodman, Checklist, 17 CAN.TAX], 155, 161-62 (1969) (on file with author). The
legislation, however, died on the Order Paper when a provincial election was called and was not
reintroduced by the social democratic New Democratic Party that carne to power.
147. E.J.BENSON, PROPOSALS FOR TAXREFORM (1969). Foruseful summaries ofthe 'WhitePaper's
proposals, see Buoovetsky d. Bird, supra note 129, aI18-20; Head,supra note I 12, at 61-67.
148. BENSoN,supranole 147,~3.3 (Slating that "[t]hegovernmentrejeclstheproposition that every
increase in economic power, no matter what its source, should he treated the same for tax purposes"),
149. Id. ~ 2.5 (noting that the Commission's proposed family unit would create a "tax on marriage"),
150. Id. ~ 5.24 (concluding that "special rules are still needed for the mineral industry").
151. Id. ,-m 3.13-.18. The White paper proposed that to avoid harsh treatment under the ordinary
rates, special rules beenacted to exempt gains on the sale ofprincipal residences, and proposed 10tax only
half the gains of widely-held Canadian companies. Id. mJ 3.33-.35. In order to prevent retroactive
application of the tax, the White Paper also proposed that tax should only apply to gains accruing after a
stipulated "valuation day." Id. ~ 3.16.
152. !d. '\13.42.
153. Id.13.41.
154. !d. '\I 3.33. This approach had been considered in the Commission's Report, but was not
specifically recommended. 3 REpORT OFTHE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, supra note 116, at 344,
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In the White Paper itself, the Minister of Finance welcomed "public
discussion ofthe proposals ... before Parliament is asked to approve a bill to
implement tax reform."!" For this purpose, the Government's preferred
vehicle was the parliamentary hearings on the White Paper conducted by the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade, and Economic
Affairs and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and
Commerce. Unlike congressional committees in the United States, these
committees had limited staff and minimal technical knowledge and were
completely Unprepared for the difficult task of reviewing and commenting
upon detailed tax proposajs.!" The Commons committee alone received 524
briefs and 1,093 letters, and heard 211 oral presentations from 820
individuals.':"
The vast majority of these submissions were from corporations and
business associations,ISS most of which were highly critical of the proposals
to tax capital gains at ordinary rates and to tax accrued gains on widely-held
shares every five years.!" Many organizations also objected to the taxation
ofcapital gains as well as gifts and estates, notwithstanding the White Paper's
proposal to defer the recognition of gains on bequests until the property is
ultimately sold.':" The Ontario Government released a set of counter-
proposals in June 1970, recommending significantly lower capital gains tax
rates, taxation of accrued gains at death, and a simultaneous and substantial
reduction in wealth transfer taxes."! Small business owners organized a
broader campaign ofpublic advertisements, letters, speaking tours, and rallies
under the banner of the Canadian Council for Fair Taxation, established in
December 1969.162 According to the group's founder and President, John
Bulloch, the combination of capital gains tax and the estate tax amounted to
"an attack on the middle-class values ofhard work, thrift and initiative" and
a "confiscation ofthe money and resources of the huge middle segment ofthe
378-80.
155. BENSON,supra note 147, '!MJ 1.1, 1.4.
156. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 129, at 21.
157. STANDING COMM.ON FIN.,TRADE, ANDECON. AFFAIRS, REpORTNo. 18, RESPECTING THE
WHITEPAPERONTAX REFORM5 (1970).
158. Gardner, supra note 107, at 252.
159. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 129, at 21-22; Head, supra note 112, at 67-70.
160. BIRD &BUCOVETSKY,supra note 87, at 34; see also HARTLE, supra note 22, at 66-72.
161. CHARLES MACNAUGHTON, ONTARIO PRoPOSALSFORTAX REFORM lNCANADA (1970).
162. Gardner, supra note 107, at 252; Philipps, supra note 9, at 133-34.
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population."!" At the height of the campaign, the Government was reported
to be receiving protest letters at a rate of7,000 each day.!"
When the parliamentary committees reported in the fan of 1970, it was
not surprising, as one commentator observed, that they would "reflect in
varying degrees the overwhelmingly hostile reaction ofrepresentatives of the
business and professional organisations from whom the bulk of the briefand
other submissions were received. "155 According to the Commons committee,
the one-half inclusion rate for shares of widely-held corporations should be
extended to all capital assets.'?' the five-year realization rule for these shares
should be abandoned,':" and the proposal to tax accrued gains at death should
be restored in order to prevent indefinite deferral.!" Since the last of these
recommendations would, the committee noted, "magnifjy] the problem,
brought to the committee's attention innumerable times, of the concurrent
impact ofthe two taxes at the same time, at death," a further recommendation
proposed a reduction of the federal estate tax "across the board, either by
reducing the rates or by expanding the brackets."!" The Senate committee
went further, recommending a distinction between short-term and long-term
gains and a rate of tax on the latter limited to the lesser of 25% or half the
marginal income tax. rate of the taxpayer.'?" and the postponement of tax on
transfers ofproperty by gift as well as at death, with a carryover ofthe donor's
cost to the recipient. J71 In addition, the committee suggested, the Government
"might well consider abandoning the estate tax field to the provinces. ,,172
The Government, which had given itselfroom to maneuver by presenting
its response to the Commission Report in the fonn of a White Paper rather
than a budget,'?' substantially revised its proposals in light of the
163. Ronald Anderson, Benson Meets Hostile Response at Public Meetings on Proposals, GLOBE
& MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 11, 1970, at AI.
164. Ronald Anderson, Tax Reform Fight Found Producing Hysteria, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Feb. 21, 1970, atBl.
165. Head,supranote 112, at70;seealsoBucovetsky&Bird,supranote 129, at21 (concluding that
their limited staffand minimal technical knowledge "meant that the two Committees were unlikely to serve
as anything else than a sounding board for those segments ofpublic opinion that were most vocal").
166. STANDING COMM.ONFIN., TRADE ANDECON.AFFAffiS, supra note 157, at 26.
167. !d.
168. Id. at 33.
169. !d. at 33-34.
170. STANDlNGSENATE COMM. ONBANKING, TRADEANDCOMMERCE, REpORT ONTHEWHITEPAPER
PROPOSALS FORTAXREFORM PRESENTED TOTHESENATE Of CANADA 59-60 (1970).
171. !d. at 61.
172. Id. at 45.
173. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 129, at 21 (explaining that the defeat ofa budget constitutes a
"want of confidence" requiring the government's resignation, while a White Paper constitutes "an
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parliamentary committee reports and the organized opposition, releasing its
final tax reform package in the form of draft legislation accompanying the
federal budget on June 18, 1971.174 Following the recommendations of the
Commons committee, the draft legislation adopted a one-half inclusion rate
for all capital gains and losses accruing after a designated valuation day,175
dropped the White Paper proposal to tax accrued gains on widely-traded
shares every five years.!" and accepted the Carter Commission's original
proposal to tax accrued gains when property is transferred on death as well as
by gift. 177 Following the recommendation of the Senate committee, the
Government decided to abandon the estate and gift tax field to the
provinces.l 78
The reasons for the Government's decision were expressed in four short
paragraphs in its Summary of 1971 Tax Reform Legislation. First, it
explained, the combination of capital gains tax and estate tax at death "could
in some instances result in substantial tax impact arising on the death of a
taxpayer. ,,179 Second, it continued, "[a] reduction in federal estate taxes to the
extent suggested by the Commons committee would result in a revenue loss
ofabout halfthe CA$55 million now receivedby the federal government from
this source" after payment of the provincial share to provincial
governments. '80 Third, it emphasized, "lt]wo provinces now return their entire
share of estate taxes to estates and it is no longer possible to establish a
uniform national system of death duties through federal legislation.?!" As a
result, it concluded, "[i]n these circumstances, it has been decided that the
federal government will vacate the estate and gift tax field on December 31,
1971."182 Thus, it would seem, the introduction of capital gains tax at death,
the low revenue yield for the federal government, and the disparate effects of
federal and provincial joint occupancy of the field led to the repeal of the
federal gift and estate tax. Unstated, ofcourse, was the organized opposition
expression ofthe thrust of government thinking that nonetheless provides freedom for alteration or strategic
retreat").
174. E.1. BENSON, SUMMARY OF1971TAX REFORM LEGJSLATlON (1971).
175. !d. at 30, 32-33.
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to capital gains and wealth transfer taxes reflected in public campaigns and
submissions to the parliamentary committees.
By sacrificing the federal gift and estate tax, the Government finally
obtained the acquiescence oforganized interest groups to the introduction of
capital gains tax and the recognition ofaccrued gains at death. In a letter to
the editor of the Toronto Daily Star, Canadian Council for Fair Taxation
President John Bulloch praised the "highly nationalistic" tax legislation for
abolishingwealth transfer taxes "that would, in combinationwith capital gains
taxes, have forced the sale of family businesses, frequently to foreign
interests."!" The construction industry and the Canadian Real Estate
Associationwelcomed the repeal ofthe federal gift and estate tax because "the
small builder is still the backbone ofthe residential construction industry."!"
The business press was generally favorable, characterizing the tax reform
legislation as "a far superior tax plan" to the White Paper.'!' Aside from a
critical editorial in the Toronto Daily Star,lE6 and unfavorable commentary
from a few Canadian tax academics,"? the predominantpublic response to the
repeal of the federal gift and estate tax was silence. taa
183. John F. Bulloch, Letter to the Editor, Benson's Budget Is Solid Proofthat Citizen Involvement
Works, TORONTO DAILY STAR, June 22, 1971, at 7.
184. Kenneth B. Smith,Realtors Praise Government/or Rejecting Capital Gains Tax on the Sale
a/Taxpayer's Residence, GLOBE & MAIL(Toronto}, June 19, 1971, at Bi3.
185. lH. Asper,BensonIceberg BecomesBenson CompromiseandaPolitical Timebombis Defused,
GLOBE & MAIL(Toronto}, June 19, 1971, at B3.
186. Editorial, Santa to the Rich, TORONTO DAllY STAR, June 30, 1971, at 6 (arguing that the
abolition of federal wealth transfer taxes "clearly violates a principle to which society should give some
deference: equality of opportunity. And it overlooks without justification a perfectly good source of
government revenue,"}, The editorial proceeded to describe the repeal ofthe federal gift and estate tax as
"but one example ofMr. Benson's depressingly long march from Carter's central concern with tax equity,"
adding, "[t]hepeople who would havedirectlybenefited from its implementation were not heard in Ottawa:
their small voices, ignorant and poor, were submerged in me flood ofglossy briefs that poured into the
capital from all the vested interests." Jd.
187. See, e.g., Gordon Bale, Letter to the Editor, Benson TaxBill Called Anemic, GLOBE & MAll
(Toronto), June 25, 1971, at A7 (describing repeal of the federal gift and esta te tax as "tax regressi on ruther
than tax reform"); see also Richard M. Bird, The Case jOr Taxing Personal Wealth, in REpORTOF
PROCEEDINGS Of THE TWENTY-THIRD TAXCONFERENCE, supra note 75, at 24 (defending wealth transfer
taxes on "moraJ, social and economic grounds" and emphasizing the need for "a reaffirmation of the
national interest in taxing wealth"}; John Bossons,Economic Overview of the TaxReform Legislation, in
REpORT OFPROCEEDINGS OFTHE TwENTY-THIRDTAXCONfERENCE, supra note 75, at 54 (concluding that
the repeal of the federal estate tax "would provide a substantial windfall for a relatively small number of
presentwealth holders" equivalent to"a lump-sum transfer of approximately $4.5 billion to individuals who
currently own wealth that would be taxed in future years under the estate tax").
188. Bird, supra note 145, at 133.
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In Parliament, where the Liberal Party held a comfortable majority,
enactment of the draft legislation was never in doubt. While the Progressive-
Conservative Leader of the Opposition criticized the Government for the
inconsistencyofamending the gift and estate tax in 1968andrepealing it three
years later.!" he and the members of his parliamentary caucus generally
supported the decision to repeal the federal gift and estate tax. In fact, several
complained that since provincial governments might continue to levy
succession duties, the taxation ofcapital gains at death could create "extreme
hardship"-particularly for family farms.!" Only members of the social
democraticNew Democratic Party opposedabolition ofthe tax, criticizingthe
Government forabandoning thePrime Minister's campaignpromise ofa "Just
Society" by ignoring equality of opportunity and tax progressivity. '" After
189. See, e.g., House a/Commons Debates (June 23, 1971) at7307 (Hon.Robert Stanfield)(arguing
that "the minister put the country through a lot oftunnoil and trouble by an increase in estate taxes in an
attempt to reduce the tax on very small estates. Now, with great fanfare the minister announces its
abolition, also for the very best of reasons."); id. (Dec. 17, 1971) at 10,572 (Hon. Robert Stanfield)
(contending that after the reform of the estate tax in 1968, the minister of finance was "doing away with
all of what he put before the House two years previously and all that he had fought for in the House").
190. Id. (Nov. 8, 1971) at 9447 (Hon. Gordon Ritchie) (suggesting that the federal capital gains tax
in combination with provincial estate taxes "will create extreme hardship in agriculture and in the farm
units as we know them today"); see also id, (June 22, 1971) at 7226 (Hon. Marcel J.A Lambert) (arguing
that with the introduction of a federal capital gains tax, "[tjhe people for whom this means another tax on
top of other taxes are the farmers and ranchers, particularly those who live in provinces where the removal
ofthe estate tax is meaningless"); id. (Nov. 8, 1971) at 9416 (Hon. CliffDowney) (suggesting that despite
the abolition of the federal estate tax, "really there will be no respite for many people in this country in
respect of estate taxes, simply because there has not been sufficient consultation with the provinces"); id.
(Nov. 9, 1971) at9483 (Hon. GordonRitchie)(arguingthat"Ireallydo not see how you can have an estate
tax as well asa capital gains tax applied to the farming industry. You can have one orthe other, but Idoubt
that you can have both. Ifyou have both the resultwiil be a taxjungle because a number ofprovinces have
indicated they are going to retain and even increase estate taxes."); id. (Nov. 15, 1971) at 9568 (Hon.
Wallace Bickford Nesbitt) (suggesting that following the repeal of the federal estate tax, "[u]ndoubtedly
some ofthe provinces will move into the estate tax field, as a result ofwhich Canadians in certain parts of
Canada will, in effect, be taxed doubly as compared with Canadians in other places"); id. (Nov. 15, 1971)
at 9589 (Hon. Marcel 1.A Lambert) (suggesting that federal and provincial estate taxes have contributed
to foreign ownership ofCanadian businesses, and that they are "the reason fami ly businesses have been sold
to strangers, whether they are from the United States or elsewhere'').
I9l. See, e.g., id. (Sept. 14, 1971) at 7803 (Hon. 1. Edward Broadbent) (arguing that the abolition
ofthe estate taxis detrimental to the principle ofequality of opportunity, and that the Liberal party ''which
governs this country is the one which talks about equality of opportunity. This is the same party that is
abolishing estate taxes. So much for justice in that area."); id. (Sept 15,1971) at 7841 (Hon. David
Orlikow) (describing gift and estate taxes as "one of the basic features of every progressive tax system");
id. (Sept. 17, 1971) at 7955 (Hon. John Gilbert) (suggesting that the abolition offedera1 wealth transfer
taxes "will further stratify the Canadian people into an economic caste system"); id. (Dec. 10, 1971) at
10,369 (Hon. John Burton) (arguing that "it is absolutely essential, if we are to have any sort ofjust society
at all, to tax inherited wealth").
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minor technical amendments, the draft legislation was passed on
December 17, 1971, and came into effect on January I, 1972.
3. Provincial Aftermath: 1971-1985
At the provincial level, the federal government's decision to repeal the
federal gift and estate tax was generally opposed.':" Although the Province
ofQuebec had long favored exclusive provincial jurisdiction ofthese taxes"?
and welcomed federal abandonment of the field,'?' most other provinces
objectedto the lossof revenuefrom federalrentalpaymentsandworried about
the prospect aftax competition among provinces opting to collect their own
succession duties.!" Smaller provinces in particular complained about the
lack ofprior consultationand the absence ofadequatenotice to establish their
own gift and succession duties, as well as the administration and collection
costs that this would entail, 196 requesting the federal government to maintain
the existing system of estate and gift taxation for at least a year from
January I, 1972, to give them time to address the implications of the federal
proposal.'?" Although it refused to accede to this request, the federal
government nonetheless offered to administer and collect provincially-
imposed succession duties and gift taxes for a period of three years,provided
tbat (I) the agreements were entered into by at least four provinces, (2) each
participating province would agree to a model act under which the base ofthe
tax would be the same for all provinces, (3) "some degree of uniformity of
rates would be provided under the model Acts having regard to the rates now
in effect in those provinces imposing their own succession duties," and (4) "it
192. Carter, supra note 71, at 239.
193. See, e.g., FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE 1963,at 47 (1964); GoV'TOFCAN., THE TAXING
POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION OFCANADA 34 (Working Paper on the Constitution, 1969).
194. REpORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTy-THIRD TAX CONFERENCE, supra note 75, at 267
(MichelBelanger, Secretaryof the TreasuryBoard,Province ofQuebec, stating that "[tjhereis some benefit
in having at least one more field of taxation where there will no longer be joint occupancy.").
195. See, e.g., id. at 260 (H. Ian MacDonald, Deputy Treasurer-andDeputy Minister of Economics,
Province of Ontario, criticizing the federalgovernment's decision as "a withdrawal from fiscal leadership,
an invitation to tax avoidance,and an undermining of the equity considerations whichloomso large in the
federal tax reform program.''). Although provincial governments would gain some revenueover time from
the taxation of accrued gains at death, revenue estimates suggested that these were unlikely to exceed
revenue losses from the abolition of the federal estate tax. Bossona, supra note 187, at 56 (projecting
annual losses for all provincialgovernments ofCASI60,OOO,OOO in 1972, growing to CA$451,OOO,OOO in
2002). For a similar conclusion, see BIRO & BUCOVETSKY, supra note 87, at 54-55.
196. Carter, supra note 71, at 241.
197. CAN. TAX FOUND., THE NATIONAL FINANCES 1971·72, at 49 (1972).
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would be clear that the federal government's role is purely administrative and
that the presentation to the public would make it clear that it is a provincial,
not a federal tax ...198
In Alberta, where the provincial share of the federal estate tax had been
refunded since 1967, the Provincial Government made it clear that it had no
intention to enter into any such agreement and would not introduce its own
wealth transfer tax.!" In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, however, where the
New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) had won provincial elections in 1969 and
1971,as well as the fourAtlanticProvinces,Provincial Governments accepted
the federal government's offer and introduced largely uniform succession
duties and gift taxes.t" In order to protect their succession duties, British
Columbia and Ontario entered into agreements with the federal government
for the collection of gift tax, and Quebec enacted its own gift tax which it
collected as of January 1, 1972.'" At the beginning of 1972, therefore, the
federal government was collecting the uniform succession duty for six
provinces and gift tax for eight provinces, the Governments of British
Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec were collecting their own succession duties,
Quebec was collecting its own gift tax, and Alberta levied no wealth transfer
taxes. Not surprisingly, this situation did not last very long.
Of the six provinces accepting the federal government's offer to
administer and collect provincial succession duties, Prince Edward Island was
the first to repeal its succession duty legislation, which it did before any tax
was even ccllected.i" Estimating that total collections from the new tax over
198. House ojCommonsDebotes (Oct. 19, 1971)at 8851 (Hon. PatrickM. Mahoney, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister of Finance); see also REpORTOFPROCEEDINGS OFTHETwENTY-THIRDTAX
CONFERENCE, supra note 75, at 275-76 (Douglas H. Clark, Department of Finance, Ottawa). The offer to
collectprovincial succession duties was extended only to the seven provinces (other than British Columbia,
Ontario, and Quebec) that did not collect their own succession duty at the time. The offer to collect
provincial gift tax was extended to the nine provinces (other than Quebec) that had entered into federal-
provincial tax collection agreements in the field ofpersonal income taxation. Id.
199. Hon. Gordon Miniely, 1972 Budget Address Before the .Legislative Assembly of Alberta
(Mar. 17, 1972},pub/ished byGov't Publ'ns, 1972,at6(statingthat the Provincial Govemment"will not
... enter into an agreement for the collection on our behalf of succession duties, and estate and gift taxes,
as we have no intention of imposing these taxes on citizens ofAlberta").
200. CAN.TAXFOUND., PROVINCIAL ANDMUNICIPAL FINANCES 1975, at 87 (1975). According to
one commentator at the time, "revenue considerations were ofprimaryconcem to these six provinces; they
concluded that they simply could not afford to give up this source of revenue." WOLFE D. GoODMAN,
CANADIAN TAX PAPERNo. 56, THENEW PROVINCIAL SUCCESSION DUTYSYSTEM: AN ExAM1NATlON OF
TIlE SUCCESSION DUl'Y ACTSOFTHEATLANTIC PROVINCES, MANITOBA ANDSASKATCHEWAN I (1972).
201. PROVINCIAL ANDMUNICIPAL FINANCES 1975, supra note 200, at 87.
202. BIRD& BUCOVETSKY, supra note 87, at 40.
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three years would amount to only CA$240,000,2°3 the Provincial Government
apparently concluded that the anticipated revenue was simply not worth the
effort. In his budget speech in 1973, the Province's Minister of Finance
proudly declared that "Alberta and Prince Edward Island are presently the
only two provinces without some form ofdeath duties..,204 Fearing the loss of
investmentto this "tax haven," the Government ofNova Scotia announced on
February 23, 1973 that its succession duty and gift tax would expire by
March 31, 1974.205 A month later, New Brunswick's Minister of Finance
blamed "tax policies in other provinces" when he announced therepeal ofhis
province's succession duty and gift tax effective December 31, 1973.206
Newfoundland concluded the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in Atlantic
Canada by repealing its succession duty and gift tax effective April 9, 1974.107
In Western Canada, where Alberta became Canada's first "death tax
haven" when it refused to enact a succession duty or gift tax in 1972/°8
provincial wealth transfer taxes lasted only a few more years. Although the
Premier of British Columbia promised in June 1972 to repeal his province's
succession duty and gift tax by April 1, 1973,209 the election of a N.D.P.
Government the next month put this policy on hold. 210 When the collection
agreements with the federal government expired at the end of 1974, British
Columbia assumed the administration of its own gift tax, and N.D.P.
Governments in Manitoba and Saskatchewan began collecting their own
203. Id. at 40 n.122.
204. Han. T.E. Hickey, P.E.I. Minister of Pin., Budge! Speech Before the Legislative Assembly
(Feb. 8, 1973),published by Gov't Publ'ns, 1973, at 5.
205. Han. Peter Nicholson, N.S. Minister of'Eln., Budget Address Before the Legislative Assembly
(Feb. 23, 1973). For references to the "tax haven" problem, see House of Assembly Debates and
Proceedings (Feb. 23, 1973) at 936 (exchange between Nova Scotia Minister of Finance and an opposition
member).
206. Hon. Jean-Maurice Simard, N.B. Minister of Fin., BUdget Speech Before the Legislative
Assembly (Mar. 20, 1973), published by Gov't Publ'ns, 1973, at 23. For family fauns and fishing
businesses, provincial succession duty ceased to apply from March 31, 1973. Id.
207. PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL FINANCES 1975, supra note 200, at 87.
208. HARTLE, supra note 22, at 75.
209. H.C. to Cancel Death Duties and Gift Tax, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 2,1972, at 82 (on
file with author).
210. See Debates ofthe Legislative Assembly (B.C.) (Oct. 24, 1972) at 235-36 (Han. D. Barrett),
available at http://www.legis.gov.bc.calbansard/30thlst/30p_Ols_721024z.htm (Premier David Barrett
defended the continuance oftbe provincial succession duty as follows: "Ifone rich man leaves because of
this law or because of succession duty then I say let him go. And good riddance! We'd be far better off
withoutbimratherthanhavingsomeone livingaround here who's trying to escape their social and financial
responsibility to the people ofBritish Columbia .... We say the rich are welcome, the capital we want it
to stay, but it must pay its fair share.").
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succession duties and gift taxes."! The election of the conservative Social
Credit Party in British Columbia at the end of 1975, however, marked the
beginning ofthe end ofwealth transfer taxes in WestemCanada. In his 1977
budget speech, British Columbia's Minister of Finance announced that the
provincial successionduty and gift tax would beabolished in order to prevent
the "forced" sale of family farms and businesses to "outsiders" and "to
encourage the retention and accumulation of capital by residents of British
Columbia."?" Later that year, the N.D.P. Government in Saskatchewan
announced that it would repeal the provincial succession duty and gift tax,
notwithstanding the Government's conviction that "a tax on wealth is a fair
tax"-attributing this decision to the abolition of these taxes in other
provinces and "a widespread opinionthat the successors ofthe average citizen
will be subject to the tax" even though it applied to less than three percent of
estates in Saskatchewan-" Although the N.D.P. Government in Manitoba
maintained its commitment to provincial wealth transfer taxes in its 1977
budget.-" a Conservative Government was elected later that year and repealed
these taxes in early 1978.215
By 1978, therefore, Ontario and Quebec were the only Canadian
jurisdictions that continued to collect succession duties and gift taxes?" In
each ofthese provinces, however, the Provincial Government had adopted a
policy of gradually reducing these taxes over time as revenues from the
taxation of post-1971 capital gains increased-regarding these taxes as
temporary measures to maintain revenues until "the capital gains tax
matures.vi'" In Ontario, where successionduty rates were originally increased
211. PROVINCIAL ANDMUNICIPAL FrNANCES 1975, supra note 200, at 87.
212. Hon. EvanM. Wolfe, B.C. Minister ofFin., Budget Address Before the Legislative Assembly
(Jan. 24, 1977),published by Dep'tofFin., 1977, at 23.
213. Hon. Walter E. Smishek, Sask. MinisterofFin., Budget Speech Before the Legislative Assembly
{Mar. 10, 1977),published byDep'tofTreasury; 1977, at 30.
214. Hon. Saul A. Miller, Man. Minister of Fin., 1977 Manitoba Budget Address Before the
Legislative Assembly (Apr. 22, 1977), published by Dep'r of Treasury, 1977, at 16. According to the
Minister: "We believe the federal government belongs in the estate tax field, and weareprepared to vacate
it, ifand when Ottawa recognizes its responsibility. In the interim, we believe the provincial Succession
Duty Act should be maintained." ld.
215. Bird, supra note 145, at 140 .
. 216. Like British Columbia, Ontario began collecting its own gift tax in 1975 after the collection
agreementwith the federal government expired. A.V.NEIL, SUCCESSION DUTYANDGfFTTAXHANDBOOK
1976-77, at 107 (1977).
217. Hon. W. Darcy McKeough, Treasurer of Ont., 1972 Ontario Budget Address Before the
Legislative Assembly (Mar. 28, 1972),publishedbyTaxation & Fiscal Policy Branch, Ministry ofTreasury,
Econ. & lntergcvemmental Affairs. 1972, at 37; see also Hon. John White, 1973 Ontario Budget Address
Before the LegislativeAssembly (Apr. 12, 1973), publishedbyTaxation and Fiscal Policy Brunch, Ministry
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in 1972 in order to compensate for the loss offederal rental payments,"! basic
exemptions were increased from CA$100,000 to CA$150,000 in 1974,'"
CA$250,000 in 1975,'" and CA$300,OOO in 1977.'" Making the perceived
connection between succession duty and capital gains tax explicit, the 1977
Budget also made capital gains tax payable at death creditable against
succession duties.f" Two years later, the Provincial Government repealed
Ontario's succession duty and gift tax, declaring that "the continuation of this
tax is hurting our economic performance and costing us jobs," and that "the
present combination of other taxes provides government with an adequate
return as wealth is accumulated.'?"
In Quebec, succession duties were reduced by 20% in each year from
1974 to 1977, resulting in a total reduction in tax otherwise payable 0[80%
by 1977 ?24 With the election ofthe sovereigntist and social democratic Parti
Quebecois (P.Q.) in November 1976, however, the final 20% reduction that
had been scheduled for 1978 was cancelled in the new Government's first
budget.f" The next year, the P.Q. Government announced that the provincial
ofTreasury, Been. & JntergovemmentalAffuirs, 1973, at 29{ernphasizingthe "undesirable irnpactonsmall
businesses, family farms and Canadian ownership" and noting that otherprovinces were vacating the field);
Raymond Garneau, Que. Minister ofFm., Budget Speech Before the National Assembly (Apr. 18, 1972),
published lJy Dep't of Fiu., Gov't of Que., 1972, at 18 (promising "the gradual abolition of succession
duties" with reductions "made in light ofpossible action on the part of the other provinces and the impact
of the capital gains tax").
218. Hen. W. Darcy McKeough, Treasurer ofOntario and Minister of Economics, Statement in the
Legislative AssemblyofOntario: Introduction to Supplementary Estimates and TaxLegislation (Apr. 26,
1971), published by Taxation and Fiscal Policy Branch, Oat. Dep't cf'I'reasury & Econ., 1971, at 27.
219. JOHNWHITE, TREASURER OFONTARIO, 1974 ONTARIO BUDGET 12 (1974).
220. W. DARcvMcKEOUGH, TREASURER OFONTARIO, 1975 ONTARJO BUDGET 27 (1975).
221. W. DARCY MCKEOUGH, TREASURER OFONTARIO, 1977 ONTARIO BUDGET 18 (1977).
222. ld. (explaiaingthatvthi s credit mechanism willresult in ever-increasing reductions in succession
duty overtime, as the value ofcapital assets increases and the Succession Duty Act is amended periodically
to recognize the effect of inflation"). This approach had been recommended by a provincial advisory
committee in 1973 in order to address the perceived ''doubletax burden" from succession duty and capital
gains tax at death. ONT.ADVISORY COMM. ONSUCCESSION DUTlES,REpORT,at v, 10-14 (1973) (on file
with author).
223. FRANKS. MILLER, TREASURER OFONTARJO, 1979ONTAIUOBUDGET 5-6 (1979).
224. Raymond Garneau, Que. Minister ofFin., Budget Speech Before the Quebec National Assembly
(Mar. 28, 1974),published byDep'tofFin., Gov'tofQue., 1974, at 19; Raymond Garneau, Que. Minister
of'Fin., Budget Speech Beforethe Quebec National Assembly (Apr. 17, 1975),published by Dep't ofFin.,
Gov't ofQue., 1975, at 19; Raymond Garneau, Que. Minister ofFin., Budget Speech Before the Quebec
National Assembly (May II, 1976),published by Dep'tofFin., Gov't of Que., 1976, at 35.
225. Jacques Parizeau, Minister of Fin., Minister of Revenue, and Chairman of the Treasury Bd,
1977-78 Budget Speech Before the Quebec National Assembly (Apr. 12, 1977),published by MInistry of
Fin., Gov't of Que., 1977, at 52 (noting that the Carter Commission had recommended the abolition of
succession duties on the basis that inheritances should "be taxed as if they were income for those receiving
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succession dutywould beretained hut substantiallyamended,withrates based
solely on amounts received by each beneficiary, the total exemption of
bequestsbetween spouses, andfurther exemptions for transfersto children and
other dependents.!" The legislation, which was introduced in Quebec's
National Assembly in June 1978, was enacted on December 22, 1978 and
came into effect immediately.227 Over the nextseveral years, the tax raised up
to about CA$45,OOO,OOO per year,228 but the Government faced continuing
pressure to abolish provincial wealth transfer taxes "because such duties do
not exist elsewhere U;I. Canada.r?" With a new Minister of Finance and a
provincial election on the horizon (which it lost), the P.Q. Government
repealed Quebec's succession duty and gift tax on April 23, 1985.230
B. The Abolition ofWealth Transfer Taxes in Australia
Unlike Canada, where the events leading to the repeal of federal and
provincial wealth transfer taxes began with the appointment of a Royal
Commission, the abolition ofwealth transfer taxes in Australia originated in
a popular protest movement initiated by a skilled carpenter and building
contractor from Western Australia named Sydney Negus."" In 1970, after
them" and adding that "governments have not adopted this theory, but have used the partial capital gains
tax as a reason for removing succession duties").
226. Jacques Parizeau, Minister ofFin., Ministredes Finances,Ministredu Revenue, and President
du Cooseil du Trescr, 1978-79 Budget Speech Before the Quebec National Assembly (Apr. 18, 1978),
published by Gov't ofQue., 1978, at 5L
227. Succession Duty Act, S.Q. 1978, ch. 37 (1978). Foradetailed review ofthe revised legislation,
see Robert Raich,An Overview ofthe New Quehec Succession Duty Act, in REpORT OFPROCEEDINGS OF
nIE THIRTIETH TAX CONFERENCE 725 (1980) (on file with author). Among the many revisions to the
provincial succession duty, one ofthe most important wasreplacement ofa ''transmissionsbasis," whereby
the tax applied to property situated outside the province only if the deceased wasdomiciled in the province
and the beneficiary was a resident of or domiciled in the province, with an"accessions basis," according
to which the tax would apply to all property situated outside the province received by a person resident or
domiciled in Quebec on the death of another person. Although the constitutionality ofthis approach was
called into question by the British Colwnbia Court ofAppeal in Canada Trost Co. v.Attorney-General of
British-Columbia, [1979] 94 D.LR. (3d) 90, available at 1978 D.LR. LEXIS 4237 (ruling on a provision
of the British Columbia succession duty enacted in 1972), it was accepted on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada in Ellett's Estate v. Attorney-General ofBritish Columbia, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 466, available at
1980N.RLEXlS 1408.
228. See GERARD D. LEVESQUE, MINISTER OFFfN., 1986-87 QUEBEC BUDGET 20 (1986).
229. JACQUES PARIZEAU,MINISfER OFFfN., 1983-84QUEBEC BUDGET 24 (1983).
230. YVEsL DUHAlME,MIN1STER OFFIN.,1985-86QUEBECBUDGET 17 (1985)(staringerroneously
that "Quebec has ... been the only province to collect succession duties" since capital gains became
partially taxable in 1972).
231. See Pedrick, supra note 91, at 114.
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learning that estate duty could have a substantial impact on relatively modest
amounts left to his wife, Negus launched a successful petition campaign
calling for the abolition ofestate duties, ran for public office, and was elected
to the Federal Senate.i" As Willard Pedrick observed, "the election of an
Independent, whose only campaign issue had been abolition of death duties,
was not lost on professional party leaders.'?" Little more than a decade later,
Australian wealth transfer taxes had completely disappeared.
Three factors appear to have contributed to the strength of Australia's
estate duty abolition movement in the early 19705,particularly amongfarmers
and small business owners.t" First and foremost, exemptions had not been
increased to account for inflation, causing commonwealth and state taxes to
apply to relatively modest estates?" At the federal level, for example, the
commonwealth estate duty at the time contained an exemption of only
AU$20,OOO for estates passing to a spouse, child, or grandchild, and
AU$10,OOO for all other estates.i" As a result, as the Taxation Review
Committee (Asprey Committee) reported, over 55% of taxable estates in
1972-73 were valued at less than AU$40,OOO and almost 83% were valued at
less than AU$80,OOO.237 At the state level, exemptions were generally lower,
resulting in a larger number of taxable estates.!" Fanning interests
consistently complained that farms had to be sold to pay the duties, though
evidence to this effect was "sparse and mostly anecdotal. "239 Not surprisingly,
therefore, it was political leaders with a rural political base who pushed the
abolition agenda.r"
In addition to the failure to adjust estate duty exemptions for inflation, a
second factor contributing to the unpopularity of these taxes was the failure
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. SMITH, supra note 70, at 79-80.
235. Id. at 79; see also Groenewegen, supra note 94, at 315; Pedrick, supra note 91, at 119-20.
236. Estate Duty Assessment Act, 1914-1950, s. 18A (Austl.), in 2 THEACTSOFTHE PARLIAMENT
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALJA 1901-1950, at 1778, 1791 (1953). These thresholds were
increased from £2,000 and £1,000 to £5,000 and £2,500 in 1953, to£10,000 and £5,000 in 1963, and to
AU$20,OOO and AU$10,OOO when the Australian currency was converted to dollars in 1966. Estate Duty
AssessmentAct, 1953, sA (Austl.); Estate Duty Assessment Act, 1963, s. 6 (Austl.); Statute Law Revision
(Decimal Currency) Act, 1966, s. 3 (Aust!.). These figures were subsequently increased to AU$40,000 and
AU$20,000 in 1972. Estate Duty Assessment Act, 1972, s. 3 (Austl.).
237. TAXATION REVIEW COW...r.,supra note 92, ~ 24.1 tb!.24.B.
238. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 119-20.
239. Id. at 121.
240. Groenewegen,supra note 94, at 311-12.
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to integrate the commonwealth and state duties.24\ While the existence ofthis
"double or duplicative" system ofwealth transfer taxes increased compliance
costs for all taxable estates,'? the relative burden was likely higher for small
and medium-sized estates>" Inaddition, a study for the Asprey Committee
concluded that the costs to comply with the commonwealth and state taxes
were larger for estates with small businesses than for most other estates.?"
Despite several recormnendations to allocate this revenue source either solely
to the states or solely to the Commonwealth Government, however, joint
occupancy remained until the taxes were finally repealed-"
A [mal explanation for the strength of Australia's estate duty abolition
movement relates to the relative ease with which these taxes could be
avoided.e" Discretionarytrusts, for example, could beused to transfer wealth
from generation to generation without any tax.241 At the federal level, gift tax
was not integrated with estate duty, and gifts themselves were aggregated only
over an eighteen-month period.248 Because of these and other deficiencies.i"
the tax was generally considered to be easily avoided by the most affluent and
sophisticated taxpayers/50 shifting the primary burden to small and medium-
sized estates."! As a result, as one commentator explained, "[t]he extent of
tax avoidance ... created public cynicism about the taxes.'?"
At the same time as the unpopularity of these taxes increased, their
importance to Commonwealth and State revenues declined. In 1973, the
Commonwealth Government collected roughly AU$75,OOO,OOO from its gift
and estate duties, representing only 0.7% of total tax revenues-a lower
percentage than at any time in their history."? While the states collected
241. SMITH, supra note 70, at 80.
242. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 119.
243. Groenewegen, supra note 94, at 315.
244.ld.
245. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
246. SMITH, supra note 70, at 79.
247. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 122.
248. Id. at 122~23.
249. For a detailed description, see Pedrick, supra note 91, at 122-24.
250. See, e.g., TAXATlONREVlEwCOMM., supra note 92, at liS (concluding that the commonwealth
estateduryvis certainly at present a tax which can be avoided. by well-advised persons with ease, and which
might almost be said to be paid principally from the estates of those who died unexpectedly or who had
failed to attend to their affairs with proper skill").
251. SMITH, supra note 70, at 79-80.
252. Id. at 79.
253. Saunders, supra note 72, at 399 tbl.L Income taxes, on the other hand, accounted for almost
70% of total tax revenues in 1973. Calculated from figures in a.E.C.D, supra note 3.
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approximately AU$185,OOO,OOO from their wealth transfer taxes in 1973,'"
accounting for almostnine percent oftotal taxrevenues,"" this percentage had
declined substantially from only a few years earlier due to the transfer of the
payroll tax field fromthe Commonwealthto the StateGovernments in 1971,256
and was lower than at anytime since the end of the Second World War. 257 As
inflation causedmore and more small estates to become taxable, moreover, net
revenues suffered because administrative costs were incurred to obtain
relatively small amounts of revenue from these estates?" In 1972-73, for
example, the smallest 55.7% of estates subject to commonwealth estate duty
accounted for only 3.9% of revenue collected.t" Joint occupancy by the
Commonwealth and State Governments also contributed to high
administrative costs as both levels of government as well as all State
Governments were required to maintain the organizational apparatus to
enforce and collect the taxes.
The abolition movement's first legislative victory was in Queensland, a
"hotbed of agrarian resentment against death duties," where the Brisbane
Courier Mail had run a series ofarticles highlighting the hardsbips caused by
death duties and the growing campaign for abolition.i" After exempting inter-
spousal transfers from estate and gift duties in 1975,261 the conservative
Liberal-Country Party coalition government embraced complete abolition in
1976 and repealed the taxes effective January I, 1977.'" Although the
coalition's Liberal Party Treasurer Sir Gordon Chalk expressed misgivings
about the budgetary implications of abolition, which would reduce state
revennes by AU$25,OOO,OOO to AU$30,OOO,OOO per year,'" Country Party
Premier Joh Bjelke-Peterson apparently concluded that the loss in revenues
would be more than offset by internal migrants attracted by the combination
ofa warm climate and tax-free bequests.?" Indeed, before the repeal had even
254. Calculated from figures in Saunders, supra note 72, at 399 tbL1.
255. Calculated from figures inO.liC.D., supra note 3.
256. For an explanation of theevents leading up tothe transfer of this revenue source, see MATHEWS
& JAY, supra note 80, at 248-54. In 1968-69, wealth transfer taxes had accounted for 16.6% of state tax
revenues. Calculated from figures in id. at 247 tbL38.
257. Saunders, supra note 72, at 399 tbL1.
258. fa. at 400.
259. TAXATION REVIEW COMM., supra note 92, ~ 24.1 tb1.24.B.
260. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 114.
261. Gift Duty Act Amendment Act, 1975, S. 2 (Queensl.].
262. Succession and Gift Duties Abolition Act, 1976, ss. 4, 6 (Queensl.).
263. Pedrick, supra note 91 at 115. For the fiscal year 1975-76, Queensland collected almost
AU$27,000,000 from succession and probate duties. !d. at 115 n.6.
264. [d. at 115 n.10. Since 1980, in fact, over half a million Australians from other states have
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come into effect, the Gold Coast Visitor's Bureau prepared a pamphlet
entitled "Legal Information on the Abolition ofDeath Duties in Queensland,"
reporting the duty payable in other States on an estate of AU$100,000 and
detailing the ways in which death duties could beavoided by investment or
domicile in Queensland.i"
Not surprisingly, other states responded to this interstate tax competition
by amending and then abolishing their own gift and estate duties. Inter-
spousal transfers were exempted in South Australia and Victoria in 1976,26(,
and in New South Wales, Western Australia and Tasmania in 1977.267 Over
the next two years, Tasmania enacted legislation reducing and then
eliminating duties on transfers to children.?" while Western Australia and
Southern Australia ended all duties for persons dying after December 31,
1979.'" Between 1980 and 1982, New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania
also enacted legislation eliminating all duties.?" As a result, as one
commentator has written, "by the early 19805, the momentum against any
death taxation in Queensland carried all other state death duties to the
grave.'?"
At the commonwealth level, interstate competition was obviously not an
issue. Nonetheless, the political momentum of the estate duty abolition
movement proved overwhelming. After Mr. Negus was elected, and before
Queensland abolished its gift and estate duties, a Senate committee examined
the subject of wealth transfer taxes, recommending that the Commonwealth
vacate the field, leaving the states to negotiate a uniform base and rates?" Of
the eight Senators on the committee, however, three filed a dissenting report
recommending that the Commonwealth repeal its gift and estate duties and
moved to Queensland, though the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in these other slates suggests that
climate was destined to playa bigger role than taxation! See Yahoo Travel, Brisbane History, available
at http://au.trave!.yahoo.comiguideJaustralialqueensland/brisbanelhistory.html.
265. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 115 n.I O.
266. Succession DutiesAct AmendmentAct, 1976, ss.9-15 (S. Austl.); Probate Duty Act, 1976, s. 2
(Vict.).
267. Stamp Duties (Amendment) Act, Im7, s. 3 (N.S. W.); Death Duty Act Amendment Act, 1977,
s.3 CW. Aust!.); Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act, 1977, S. 8 (Tes.).
268. Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Act (No.2), 1978, s. 3 (Tas.).
269. Death Duty Act Amendment Act, 1978, s. 3 C'N. Austl); Succession Duties Act Amendment
Act, 1979, s. 2 (5. Aust!.).
270. Stamp Duties (Further Amendment) Act, 1980, e. 4 (N.S.W.); Probate Duty Act, 1981, S. 3
(Viet); Deceased Persons' Estates Duties Amendment Act, 1982, s. 10 (Tas.).
271. SMITH, supra note 70, at 79.
272. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 118. Senator Negus was invited to chair the committee for the
purpose of this inquiry, but "declined on the ground that his commitment to death tax relief would disable
him from performing as an impartial chairman." Pedrick, supra note 91, at 114 n.2.
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that the states be encouraged to reduce their taxes with a view to eventual
abolition."? Although the Asprey Committee affirmed an important role for
wealth transfer taxation when it delivered its Report in January 1975,274
recommending a national integrated gift and estate duty designed to reduce
administration and compliance costs and to minimize opportunities for
avoidance,'?' the effort to modernize these taxes appeared to have been too
Iate.i" In the election that followed the Australian constitutional crisis later
that year.i" former LaborPrime Minister Gough Whitlam promised to abolish
commonwealth estate and gift duties in an unsuccessful effort to return to
power.t" During the 1977 election campaign, the incumbent Liberal Prime
Minister Malcolm Fraser announced the immediate exemption ofall transfers
to a spouse or a child, and promised to abolish commonwealth estate and gift
duties altogether if re-elected.i" After the Liberal-Country Coalition won a
majority on December 10, 1977, the Government introduced legislation to
repeal these taxes effective July 1, 1979.280 Although the Labor Party moved
to withdraw the legislation "until such time as an alternative form of tax on
capital is introduced,'?" the motion was defeated along party lines, and the
legislation was enacted in 1978.282
273. Saunders, supra note 72, at 401.
274. TAXATION REVIEW COMM., supra note 92, '[ 24.4 (emphasizing that these taxes "support the
progressivity of thetax structure by the indirect means of a progressive levy on wealth once a generation"
and "limit ... the growth of large inherited fortunes, a trend that most people would agree to have
undesirable social consequences").
275. Id. ~ 24.3.
276. SMITH, supra note 70, at 79~80 (attributing the abolition of these taxes to "tax policy inertia,
which allowed popular support for these taxes to dwindle").
277. On Novenber II, 1975, Australia's Governor-General Sir John Ken-dismissed the Labor Prime
Mini ster GoughWhi tlamafterthe Senate, in which the opposition Liberal-Country coalition had a majority,
blocked a bill that appropriated funds for the payment of government expenditure. Kerr appointed the
Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser, who obtained passage of the bill and immediately requested the
Governor-General to dissolve Parliament and call a general election. See generally Australian
Constitutional Crisis of 1975, NATIONMASTER.CQM: ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.nationmaster.com/
encyclopediaiAustralian4constitutional-erisis-of-1975 (last visited Apr. 16,2006).
278. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 116.
279. Fraser: Reject Labor's 'Recipefor Disaster,' SYDNEY MOR.<'1INOHERALD, Nov. 22, 1977, at
A8 (quoting Fraser's statement that "[ejatate duty has caused distress and hardship to thousands of
Australian families, to small business, to farmers").
280. Estate Duty Amendment Act, 1978, c. 2 {Austl.]; Gift Duty Amendment Act, 1978, c. 25
(Austl.); Pedrick, supra note 91, at 116-17.
28 L Australia did not tax capital gains until 1985. Cynthia Coleman & Margaret McKerchar, The
Chicken ortheEgg?: A HIStorical Review ofthe Influence ofTax Administration on the Developmentof
Income Tax Law in Australia; in STUDIES INTHEHISTORY OFTAXLew 302 (John Tiley ed., 2004).
282. Pedrick, supra note 91, at 116417.
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C. The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes in New Zealand
Though separated from the Australian mainland by more than a thousand
miles of water, New Zealand was not immune from the effects of estate and
gift duty abolition in Australia. Under pressure from farming interests, who
complained that increased land values resulted in a larger estate tax burden.t"
the New Zealand Government amended the estate and gift duties in 1979 by
significantly increasing the basic exemption in stages from NZ$25,OOO to
NZ$250,000 in 1982.'" Little more than a decade later, the estate tax was
effectively abolished by reducing to zero the rate of tax on persons dying on
or after December 17, 1992.'" In 1999, further legislation formally repealed
New Zealand's estate tax, though its gift tax remains in place.t"
Although less than one percent of decedents were subject to the tax in
1992,281 abolition of estate duty was welcomed by New Zealand's leading
agricultural organization, Federated Farmers ofNew Zealand, which praised
the legislation as a "victor[y] for rural business and communities."?" From
the Government's perspective, while the tax raised approximately
NZ$80,OOO,000 in 1992, this accounted for less than 0.3% of total tax
revenues.t" Finally, as Cedric Sandford has suggested, NewZealand's estate
duty "may also owe its demise, at least in part, to what happened in Australia,
because of the free movement of nationals between New Zealand and
Australia."?" As an estate-type tax based on the estates of persons dying
while domiciled in New Zealand, New Zealand's tax, like that of the
Australian states, was particularly vulnerable to tax-motivated emigration by
affluent retirees.
283. See R.A. Green & lindsay McKay, The Estate and Gift Duties Amendment Act 1979: The
DemiseofWea1th Transfer Taxation, 10 VICTORIA U. WELLrNGTON L. REv. 227, 240-42 (1980).
284. !d.
285. EstateDutyAbolitionAct, 1993 SN.Z. No. 13 (on filewith author);see AsaGunnarson,Ability
to Pay in New Zealand's Tax System, 27 VICTORIA U. WEllINGTON L. REv. 697, 711 (1997) (brief
discussion of this amendment).
286. Estate Duty Repeal Act, 1999 S.N.Z.
287. David Russell, But on the Bright Side. . Tax Refunds and Low Interest Rates Make upfor
Weather Death Duty on Houses, DAILY NEWS(New Plymouth, N.Z.), Dec. 3, 1998, at 17 (of 55,000
persons who died while domiciled in New Zealand in 1992, only 453 estates were subject to estate duty).
288. Stamp Duty Cut Applauded, CHRISTCHURCH PREss, May 27, 1999.
289. D.E.C.D., supra note 3.
290. CEDRIC SANOfORD, WHY TAX SYSTEMS DIffER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 01' THEPOLITICAL
ECONOMY OF TAXATION 100 (2000).
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D. Public Choice Theory and the Abolition ofWealth Transfer Taxes
Writing in 1978, Canadian economist Richard Bird characterized the
disappearance of Canada's wealth transfer taxes as "strange.'?" Writing in
1983, Australian economist John Head described the abolition ofAustralia's
federal estate and gift duty as "totally incomprehensible,'?" More recently,
Cedric Sandford argued that the abolition of wealth transfer taxes in both
countries "had an accidental element about it."293 While there was certainly
a large element of contingency to the events culminating in the abolition of
these taxes in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, public choice theory
suggests that the outcome in each of these cases is neither "strange," nor
"incomprehensible," nor entirely"accidental." On the contrary, the abolition
ofwealth transfer taxes in these countries was in many respects a predictable
response to the shifting political costs of these and other taxes.
In Canada, the Carter Commission's proposals to tax gifts and
inheritances as income and capital gains at death significantly increased the
political costs of the federal giftand estate tax as well as provincial succession
duties-c-taxes for which the political costs were already high given their
application to a relatively narrow gronp of people. While the 1968
amendments to the federal gift and estate tax might have lowered political
costs by rejecting the Carter Commission's proposal to tax gifts and
inheritances as income and exempting inter-spousal transfers, political costs
were clearly increased by integrating the gift and estate taxes and increasing
federal rates on estates valued at less than CA$5,OOO,OOO. Not surprisingly,
these amendments galvanized farming and small business interests, increasing
further the political costs of Canadian wealth transfer taxes and federal tax
reform more generally.!"
Although the White Paper attempted to contain these political costs by
rejecting the taxation of accrued gains at death, the proposals to tax capital
gains at ordinary rates and widely-held shares every five years were politically
very costly, sincethese measures, as John Head notes, would "impose obvious
and substantial new burdens on a relatively small but affluent, articulate and
well organised section of the community which could hardly be expected to
stand idly by," resulting in benefits that "would be widely dispersed over the
291. Bird, supra note 145, at 133.
292. Head, supra note 72, at 14.
293. SANDfORD, supra note 290, at 105.
294. See supra text accompanying note 145.
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relativelyunorganisedmass oftaxpayers at the bottom ofthe income scale.'?"
Clearly expecting opposition from organized interest groups, the Government
attempted to manage the tax reform process by referring its proposals to
parliamentary committees. These committees, however, were completely
unprepared for this task and served mostly as "sounding board[s] for those
segments ofpublic opinion that were most vocal,,296-namely, the organized
interest groups that had opposed the Carter Commission's proposals from the
outset'?" Predictably, as John Head recounts, the parliamentary committee
reports "reflectledl in varying degrees the overwhelmingly hostile reaction of
representatives ofthe business and professional organizations from whom the
bulk of the briefs and other submissions were received.'?" Finally,
confronting the prospect of substantial revenues from the introduction of
capital gains tax versus minimal revenues from the gift and estate tax (75% of
which was transferred to provincial governments or abated in the case of
provinces collecting their own succession duties), the federal government
opted to withdraw from the wealth transfer tax field, enacting a capital gains
tax on half the amount of the gain with accrued gains taxable at death?"
At the provincial level, several governments endeavored to maintain
wealth transfer taxes, though the eventual abolition of these taxes was
probably inevitable whenAlberta refused to enact a provincial succession duty
and gift tax in 1972.300 With low revenues, high administrative costs, and the
risk of inter-provincial migration, wealth transfer taxes were abolished in
Atlantic Canada by 1974, Western Canada by 1978, and Ontario in 1979.'"
While Quebec held out, substantially amending its succession duty in 1978,
even it succumbed to the pressures of horizontal tax competition, repealing its
succession duty and gift tax in 1985.302
In Australia, the political costs of estate and gift duties collected by
Commonwealth and State Governments increased significantly in the late
1960s and early 1970s as inflation eroded the real value of exemptions,
increasing the number of taxable estates?" Even before then, the political
costs of these taxes were probably high, given their relatively narrow
295. Head, supra note 112, at 69-70.
296. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 129, at 21.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 158-69.
298. Head, supra note 112, at 70.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 173·82.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 202-23.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 224-30.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 235-38.
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application and the high administrative and compliance costs resulting from
joint occupancy byboth levels of government.304 Not surprisingly, those who
were subject to the tax established an organized movement pressing for
abolition of the taxes. As the political costs of these taxes increased and
governmentreliance on estate and gift duties asa source ofrevenuedecreased,
these governments looked at other less politically costly sources of revenue
as alternatives to these taxes. 305 When Queensland abolished its estate and gift
duties effective January 1, 1977, horizontal tax competition quickly led to the
abolition ofthese taxes in all other states?" At the federal level, committees
made recommendations for major reform, but the political momentum ofthe
abolition movement carried the day, and commonwealth gift and estate duties
were repealed effective July 1, 1979. 307 New Zealand held out for a little more
than a decade, but the combination ofpolitical opposition, low revenues, and
horizontal tax competition proved fatal there as well, as estate tax rates were
reduced to zero for persons dying on or after December 17, 1992, and the tax
was repealed in 1999.308
IV. CONCLUSION
Opponents of wealth transfer taxes are apt to take comfort both from their
abolition in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and from public choice
explanations for these events, while those who support these taxes may
despair. As an advocate of these taxes myself,'?" this is obviously not what I
intend. Although wealth transfer taxes were abolished in Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, are under pressure in the United Kingdom, and are
scheduled to be phased out in the United States, they appear to have retained
their vitality in several other countries.'!" a few of which rely on these taxes
more today than they did in the early 1970s. 3lJ While political costs and
304. See supra text accompanying notes 241.45.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 253·59.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 260-71.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 272-82.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 283-90.
309. Duff, supra note 5.
310. In Norway, for example, wealth transfer taxes accounted for 0.21% of tax revenue and 0.08%
ofGDPin 1971,and 02% oftax revenue and 0.09% ofGDP in200l. Similarly, in Japan, wealth transfer
taxes accounted for 1.27% oftax.revenue and 0.26% ofGDP in 197 I, and 122% of'tax revenue and 0.35%
ofGDP in 2001. See O.E.C.D., supra note 3.
311. In France and Germany, for example, wealth transfer taxes accounted for larger percentages of
tax revenues and GDP in 2001 than they did in 1970: increasing in France from 0.52% oftax revenue and
0.18%ofGDPin 1971 to L23% oftax revenue and 0.6% ofGDP in2001, and increasing in Germany from
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benefits may influence the choices that governments make among different
revenue sources, these are clearly not the only factors, as political values and
ideologies as well as the structure of state institutions can also play an
important role.t"
Nonetheless, it is important to be realistic about the considerable political
challenges that are apt to make the retention or reintroduction of wealth
transfer taxes especially difficult. As experience in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand suggests, the political costs of these taxes tend to be much
higher than those of broad-based income, consumption, or payroll taxes, and
can increase significantly if tax reforms or tax policy inertia increase the
burden on small and medium-sized estates. In Canada, tax reform had this
effect, as owners ofsmall businesses and family farms opposed gift and estate
tax amendments that increased rates on estates valued at less than
CA$5,OOO,OOO, as well as the possibility that capital gains tax and estate tax
might be collected at death.'? In Australia and New Zealand, on the other
hand, tax policy inertia appears to have been at fault, as inflation eroded the
value of estate and gift tax exemptions and tax avoidance was not contained,
causing the burden to fall increasingly on small and medium-sized estates.?"
In federal systems, moreover, the political costs ofwealth transfer taxes
are greatly increased by joint occupancy by both levels of government
(vertical tax competition) and mobility among sub-national jurisdictions
(horizontal tax competition). In Canada and Australia, the failure to
effectively integrate federal and sub-national wealth transfer taxes resulted in
a "duplicative" system involving increased administration costs for
governments and higher compliance costs for taxpayers.?" In Canada, federal
withdrawal from the wealth transfer tax field effective January 1, 19721ed to
the gradual demise ofprovincial wealth transfer taxes in the 1970s and 1980s,
which succumbed to the pressures ofhorizontal tax competition in the absence
of a federal tax with a credit for provincial taxes."! In Australia, where the
0.2% ortaxreveaues and 0.06% of GOP in 1970to 0.4% of tax revenues and 0.15% ofGDP in2001. See
id.
312. See, e.g., Banting, supra note 9,at 352-55 (considering literature on thepolitics ofredistribution
as well as public choice theory, and concluding that these approaches should be understood as
complementary, not contradictory).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46, 160-64.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 235-40, 246-52. In New Zealand, the exemption was only
NZ$25,OOO in 1979, before it was increased in stages to NZ$250,000 in 1982. See supra note 284 and
accompanying text.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 9l-99, 241-45.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 192-230. In the United States, where legislation phasing
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commonwealth estate duty never included a credit for state level wealth
transfer taxes, abolition in the State of Queensland in 1977 triggered a
competitive "race to the bottom" that led to the repeal ofall other state wealth
transfer taxes by the early 19808.3 17
For those who wish to preserve and restore the taxation of wealth
transfers, then, what lessons can be drawn from the abolition ofthese taxes in
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand? Reflecting on public choice accounts
oftaxpolicy andthehistorical experience in thesecountries, three conclusions
seem evident. First, if wealth transfer taxes are to be maintained or
reintroduced, thepolitical costs ofthese taxes must be minimized. Crucially,
basic exemptions must exclude small and medium-sized estates and be
regularly adjusted for increases in asset prices,"! Where these exemptions do
not fully relieve the burden on family farms and small businesses,':" other
rules should provide for special valuation and deferral of tax so that these
assets need not be sold in order to pay the tax?" Capital gains taxes must be
adjusted to lessen the combined impact of two taxes when property is
transferred by gift or on death,for example by permitting the donor's cost to
carryover to the recipient. Administrative and compliance costs must be
minimized by integrating federal and sub-national taxes or abolishing the
latter, by eliminating complex rate structures based on the size of an estate and
the shares received by different classes ofbeneficiaries, and by statutory rules
designed to minimize opportunities for avoidance. Horizontal tax competition
out the federal gift and estate tax also eliminates the federal credit for state wealth transfer taxes, a similar
process of horizontal tax competition suggests the eventual demise of these state taxes. See GRAETZ &
SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 209~11.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 260-71.
318. This lesson is particularly relevant to the United Kingdom, where political opposition to the
country's inheritance taxhas increased significantly as the basic exemption, which is indexed for consumer
inflation, has failed to keep pace with increases in housing prices. See MAXWELL, supra note 6, at 14
(reporting that the current threshold of £263,000 is only slightly higher than the average cost of'ahcuse in
London). This lesson is also relevant in the United States, where political opposition to the federal gift and
estate tax increased significantly in the 199& while the unified credit remained fixed at US$600,OOO.
Although phased increases to the credit were enacted in 1997, and accelerated and increased in 2001, the
political damage may already have been done, as the very legislation that accelerated and increased the
credit in 2001 also repealed the federal gift and estate tax for 2010. See generally GRAETZ & SHAPIRO,
supra note 2.
319. In the United States, legislated Increases to the unified credit are expected to dramaticallyreduce
the number of family farms and small businesses that are subject to the federal gift and estate tax. See
CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, 109th CoNG., EFFECTS OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX ON FARMS AND SMALL
BUSINESSES at 13-16 (2005).
320. Perhaps not surprisingly, both the U.S. gift and estate tax and the Ij.K. inheritance tax include
special roles to this effect On the United States, see id. at 2~3. On the United Kingdom, see JOHNnLEY,
REVENUE LAw 1140 (4th ed. 2001).
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must be discouraged by ensuring that wealth transfer taxes are collected by
federal governments in federal systems and by applying these taxes to gifts
and inheritances received by beneficiaries who are residents of or domiciled
in the taxing jurisdiction in addition to property situated in the taxing
jurisdiction and transfers of property by persons domiciled in the taxing
jurisdiction.
Second, ifgovernments are to enact the legislative measures necessary to
preserve or re-establish wealth transfer taxes, methods must be devised in
order to protect public decision-making processes from the influence of
organized interest groups who can be expected to oppose these measures. In
Canada,for example,the Carter Commissionwas able to produce a report that
was hailed as "a landmark in the annals of taxation" because it had both the
institutional mandate and the financial resources to engage in a thorough and
nonpartisan analysis of tax policy. In contrast, the parliamentary committees
that considered the federal government's White Paper proposals in 1970 were
thrust into a highly political exercise without the knowledge or resources to
withstand the pressure exerted by organized interest groups that dominated the
process. Although this was only one of many factors that led to the eventual
abolition ofwealth transfer taxes in Canada, its impact at the time may have
been decisive.
Finally, ifthese taxes are to retain and attract public support, efforts must
also be made to increase their perceived benefits. One strategy for this
purpose might be to earmark the revenues from these taxes to a particular
expenditure program, especially a program that complements the redistributive
objectives ofthe tax such as early childhood education for chil dren from low-
income families. More generally, a greater "tax preference" for wealth
transfer taxes might result from less emphasis on the revenues raised from
these taxes, which are bound to be less than taxes on income, consumption, or
payrolls, and more explicit acknowledgement of their symbolic and social
function to lessen inequalities and unequal opportunities."! Public support for
these taxes might also be improved by applying these taxes to amounts
321. In this respect, see3 ONT.COMM. ONTAXATlON, REpORT 136 (1967) (emphasizing the social
purpose of wealth transfer taxes "to control the growth in this countryofan economical1ypowerfu[ minority
whose influence is based upon inherited wealth"); TAXATION REVIEW COMM., supra note 92, '[ 24.4
(recognizingroleofwealth transfer taxes to "limit[] the growth oflarge inherited fortunes, a trend that most
people would agree to have undesirable social consequences"); see also Bird, supra note 145, at 138
(suggesting that public support for the wealth transfer taxes in Canada was weak because "revenue was
clearly the main purpose of death taxes so far as most Canadians and Canadian governments were
concerned"); and McKay, supra note 70, at 7 (noting the rare emphasis on the social purposes of wealth
transfer taxes in New Zealand).
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received by living beneficiaries rather than the aggregate amount of a
decedent's estate, demonstrating that the tax is intended not to punish those
who have succeeded in life or to compound the misery of death, but to
regulate the distribution ofwealth and opportunities among beneficiaries for
whom a gift or inheritance is largely undeserved?" In fact, it is interesting to
note that the decline in wealth transfer taxes in O.E.c.n. countries has been
muchgreater amongcountrieswith estate-type taxes that fall on the estates of
persons dying domiciled in the jurisdiction than countries with inheritance-
type taxes that apply toamounts received by beneficiaries living in aparticular
jurisdiction. In addition to any lessons from the history of abolition in
Canada, Australia, and NewZealand, wealth transfer tax advocates might also
look to the experience of these countries where wealth transfer taxes appear
to have been more resilient.
322. See, e.g., GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 233-36, 256.
